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Abstract
Is decision making impaired in mental illness populations? Can behavioral economics provide insight into
clinical psychology? The present project addresses these broad questions through three studies. In the first
study, two meta-analyses were conducted of experiments that used the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) to assess
value based decision making in populations with mental illness. In the first meta-analysis (63 studies,
combined N = 4,978), we compared IGT performance in healthy populations and populations with mental
illness. In the second meta-analysis (40 studies, combined N = 1,813), we examined raw IGT performance
scores as a function of type of mental illness. The first meta-analysis demonstrated that individuals with
mental illness performed significantly worse than did healthy control individuals. The second meta-analysis
demonstrated no performance differences based on type of mental illness. Impairment on the IGT, however,
could indicate effects from several different decision processes. Accordingly, in the second study, using
multiple decision tasks we explored different aspects of decision making in a single group that exhibited
reliable effects in the meta-analysis, major depressive disorder. The second study answers three questions.
First, how does decision making differ in clinically depressed individuals across a range of decision tasks?
Second, where are the largest differences between clinically depressed and non-depressed individuals? And
finally, how well can decision task performance discriminate depressed individuals from healthy controls?
Depressed individuals' decision-making was significantly different across a range of decision tasks, but
impaired learning and pessimism bias showed the strongest behavioral signature of depression. Decision tasks
significantly predict depression, but are far outperformed by self-report measures as diagnostic tools. Overall,
results suggest decision tasks are better suited to identify specific impaired processes rather than for diagnostic
prediction. This study suggested depression is associated with impaired reward and punishment processing,
but what are the underlying causes behind these deficits? In the third study, we performed a detailed analysis
of reward and punishment learning in clinically depressed individuals, quantifying choice behavior by fitting
reinforcement learning models. The results suggest that depression is characterized by hyposensitivity to
reward. The reinforcement learning models show that depressed individuals engage habit-oriented model-free
learning strategies in contrast to the goal-oriented model-based strategies engaged by healthy controls. Overall
the three studies demonstrate how interdisciplinary research combining decision science and clinical
psychology can help to better understand mental illness.
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ABSTRACT 
 
THE DEPRESSED DECISION MAKER: THE APPLICATION OF DECISION 
SCIENCE TO PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 
Dahlia Mukherjee 
Joseph W. Kable 
Is decision making impaired in mental illness populations? Can behavioral 
economics provide insight into clinical psychology? The present project addresses these 
broad questions through three studies. In the first study, two meta-analyses were 
conducted of experiments that used the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) to assess value based 
decision making in populations with mental illness. In the first meta-analysis (63 studies, 
combined N = 4,978), we compared IGT performance in healthy populations and 
populations with mental illness. In the second meta-analysis (40 studies, combined N = 
1,813), we examined raw IGT performance scores as a function of type of mental illness. 
The first meta-analysis demonstrated that individuals with mental illness performed 
significantly worse than did healthy control individuals. The second meta-analysis 
demonstrated no performance differences based on type of mental illness. Impairment on 
the IGT, however, could indicate effects from several different decision processes. 
Accordingly, in the second study, using multiple decision tasks we explored different 
aspects of decision making in a single group that exhibited reliable effects in the meta-
analysis, major depressive disorder. The second study answers three questions. First, how 
does decision making differ in clinically depressed individuals across a range of decision 
tasks? Second, where are the largest differences between clinically depressed and non-
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depressed individuals? And finally, how well can decision task performance discriminate 
depressed individuals from healthy controls?  Depressed individuals’ decision-making 
was significantly different across a range of decision tasks, but impaired learning and 
pessimism bias showed the strongest behavioral signature of depression. Decision tasks 
significantly predict depression, but are far outperformed by self-report measures as 
diagnostic tools. Overall, results suggest decision tasks are better suited to identify 
specific impaired processes rather than for diagnostic prediction. This study suggested 
depression is associated with impaired reward and punishment processing, but what are 
the underlying causes behind these deficits? In the third study, we performed a detailed 
analysis of reward and punishment learning in clinically depressed individuals, 
quantifying choice behavior by fitting reinforcement learning models. The results suggest 
that depression is characterized by hyposensitivity to reward. The reinforcement learning 
models show that depressed individuals engage habit-oriented model-free learning 
strategies in contrast to the goal-oriented model-based strategies engaged by healthy 
controls.  Overall the three studies demonstrate how interdisciplinary research combining 
decision science and clinical psychology can help to better understand mental illness.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Research in mental illness is beginning to shift emphasis from a symptom-based 
focus to a more process-based one (Sanislow et al., 2010). Mental illness is currently 
organized according to clinical syndromes, but critics of this approach point to notable 
heterogeneity within syndromes and overlapping features across syndromes. As an 
alternative to the syndrome approach, psychologists are increasingly studying—and 
sometimes even treating—basic processes that cut across traditional mental-illness 
categories. This crosscutting approach has begun to shape funding priorities at the National 
Institute of Mental Health, for example, through the recently introduced Research Domain 
Criteria (RDoC) proposal (Insel et al., 2010).  
The present series of studies examines whether the process of value-based decision-
making deserves to be included in the psychopathology-process list. We use the term value-
based decision-making to denote the set of processes that is the object of study in 
behavioral and experimental economics and in the psychology of decision-making 
(including consumer behavior). We use this term to distinguish value-based decision-
making both from the cognitive psychology of reasoning and judgment and from the 
psychophysical study of perceptual decisions. Behavioral economics examines 
psychological aspects of decision making by assessing the influence of social, cognitive, 
and emotional factors on individual economic decisions. These psychological influences 
affect decision-making in a way that can be captured mathematically through 
computational modeling techniques. The application of these tasks and techniques to 
psychopathology has created an emerging new field called computational psychiatry.  
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Two kinds of evidence suggest that processes involved in value-based decision-
making might be affected by mental illness. First, the neural circuitry implicated in value-
based decision making overlaps with that known to be impaired in mental illness. Studies 
on the neuroscience of value-based decision making have focused on the fundamental role 
of medial frontal and orbitofrontal cortex, striatum, amygdala, and the modulatory 
neurotransmitter systems that project to these regions (Bartra, McGuire, & Kable, 
2013; Kable & Glimcher, 2007, 2009; Rangel & Hare, 2010). It is interesting that these 
very same regions also demonstrate neurochemical and functional disruption in different 
mental illnesses (e.g., Dom, Sabbe, Hulstijn, & Van Den Brink, 2005; Verdejo-García & 
Bechara, 2009; Verdejo-García, Pérez-García, & Bechara, 2006), including obsessive-
compulsive disorder (OCD; Cavedini et al., 2002;Lawrence et al., 2006); depression 
(Grecius et al., 2007; Mayberg, 2006; Murphy et al., 2001); alcohol, cocaine, and stimulant 
abuse (Bechara et al., 2001; Volkow & Fowler, 2000); pathological gambling (Brand et al., 
2005); and personality disorders (Raine, Lencz, Bihrle, LaCasse, & Colletti, 2000). 
Second, there is some empirical evidence for differences in value-based decision-making 
between individuals with mental illness and healthy control individuals, with examples in 
schizophrenia (Sevy et al., 2007), OCD (Tolin, Abramowitz, Brigidi, & Foa, 2003), 
substance dependence (Bechara et al., 2001; Bickel & Marsch, 2001), and depression 
(Clark, Chamberlain, & Sahakian, 2009).  
However, despite the evidence favoring research on value based decision-making 
and psychopathology, certain questions remain. First, is value-based decision making 
really impaired in mental illness populations? There are qualitative reviews implicating 
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impairment in specific disorders but no quantitative review summarizing such a 
conclusion. In Study 1, we conducted quantitative meta-analyses to answer two main 
questions: (a) whether people with mental illness display significantly impaired value-
based decision-making relative to healthy individuals, and (b) whether there are any 
differences in value-based decision-making across populations with different mental 
illnesses. The answers to these questions should inform the prospects for computational 
psychiatry—that is, whether or not researchers should study value-based decision making 
in mental illness at all and, if so, for which mental illnesses these studies might prove most 
important.  
The first study addresses whether or not decision-making is indeed impaired in 
mental illness. Assuming that is the case, how can decision-making research potentially 
add value to the existing psychopathology literature. Based off the RDoC proposal, two 
areas where process based research may be useful are as classification tools and/or 
identifying signature behavioral markers of psychopathology.  In study 2 we aim to assess 
value-based decision-making in a clinically depressed population with three objectives: (1) 
to assess potential differences in decision-making in depressed individuals compared to 
healthy controls, (2) to identify the largest differences in decision-making between 
depressed individuals and healthy controls, as well as potential underlying latent factors of 
decision-making, and (3) to determine the predictive accuracy of decision performance as 
a potential diagnostic tool. 
The previous study addresses whether decision-making performance is similarly 
impaired across decision tasks or whether type of decision task leads to variable decision 
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performance. The next step investigates the underlying causes where decision performance 
is most compromised. Based on the results in Study 2 and literature supporting impaired 
reinforcement learning in depressed individuals, Study 3 was designed to examine the 
cause of reinforcement learning deficits in clinically depressed individuals.  We analyzed 
reinforcement-based decision-making behavior of individuals diagnosed with depression 
in detail, quantifying and modeling choice behavior using reinforcement learning models. 
The results may inform future directions for assessment and treatment of depression.  
The overarching goal of the three studies is to establish whether the process of 
decision-making can serve to inform and explain psychopathology in a way that is both 
meaningful and useful in the field of clinical psychology. In short, these preliminary 
investigations probe the scope and possible future direction of the study of decision-making 
in clinical psychology. 
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CHAPTER 1: VALUE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IMPAIRMENTS IN MENTAL 
ILLNESS: A META ANALYSIS 
 
Abstract 
In this study, we assessed value-based decision-making in individuals diagnosed 
with mental illness. Two meta-analyses were conducted of studies that used the Iowa 
Gambling Task (IGT) to assess value-based decision-making. In the first meta-analysis 
(63 studies, n = 4978), we compared IGT performance in healthy and mental illness 
populations. In the second meta-analysis (40 studies, n = 1813), we examined raw IGT 
performance scores as a function of type of mental illness. The first meta-analysis 
demonstrated that individuals with mental illness performed significantly worse than 
healthy controls. The second meta-analysis demonstrated no performance differences 
based on type of mental illness. These findings suggest that value-based decision-making 
is a promising target for transdiagnostic analyses of processes that go awry in mental 
illness. A critical priority for future work, given that impairment in the IGT could arise 
from changes in several decision processes, will be to investigate the specific decision 
processes affected in different mental illnesses. 
  
 
6 
 
Value-Based Decision-Making Impairments in Mental Illness: A Meta-analysis 
 Research in mental illness is beginning to shift emphasis away from disorder 
symptoms towards basic processes that can go awry across several disorders (Sanislow et 
al., 2010). Mental illness is currently organized according to clinical syndromes, but 
critics of this approach point to notable heterogeneity within syndromes and comorbidity 
and overlapping features across syndromes (for a more detailed review see Follette, 
1996). As an alternative to the syndrome approach, psychologists are increasingly 
studying—and sometimes even treating—basic processes that cut across traditional 
mental illness categories. This crosscutting approach has begun to shape funding 
priorities at the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH), for example, through the 
recently introduced research domain criteria (RDoC) proposal (Insel et al., 2010).  
Within a process framework, one category of processes that might be worth 
investigating is the set involved in “value-based decision-making.” We use the term 
value-based decision-making to denote the set of processes that is the object of study in 
behavioral and experimental economics and in the psychology of decision-making 
(including consumer behavior). We use this term to distinguish value-based decision-
making both from the cognitive psychology of reasoning and judgment and from the 
psychophysical study of perceptual decisions.  
Two kinds of evidence suggest that processes involved in value-based decision-
making might be impacted by mental illness. First, the neural circuitry implicated in 
value-based decision-making overlaps with that known to be impaired in mental illness. 
 
7 
 
Studies on the neuroscience of value-based decision-making have focused on the 
fundamental role of medial frontal and orbitofrontal cortex, striatum, amygdala, and the 
modulatory neurotransmitter systems that project to these regions (Bartra, McGuire & 
Kable, 2013; Kable & Glimcher, 2007, 2009; Rangel & Hare, 2010). Interestingly, these 
very same regions also demonstrate neurochemical and functional disruption in different 
mental illnesses (e.g. Dom, Sabbe, Hulstijn, & Van Den Brink , 2005; Verdejo-García & 
Bechara, 2009; Verdejo-García, Pérez-García, & Bechara, 2006), including OCD 
(Cavedini et al., 2002; Lawrence et al., 2006), depression (Murphy et al., 2001; Grecius 
et al., 2007; Mayberg, 2006), alcohol, cocaine and stimulant abuse (Volkow & Fowler, 
2000; Bechara et al., 2001), pathological gambling (Brand et al., 2005) and personality 
disorders (Raine et al., 2000). Second, there is some empirical evidence for differences in 
value-based decision-making between those with mental illness and healthy controls, 
with examples in schizophrenia (Sevy et al., 2007), OCD (Tolin, Abramowitz, Brigidi, & 
Foa, 2003), substance dependence (Bechara et al., 2001; Bickel & Marsh, 2001), and 
depression (Clark, Chamberlain, & Sahakian, 2009).  
This theoretical and empirical evidence has led some researchers to propose that 
studies of value-based decision-making hold much promise for disentangling the 
fundamental processes that go awry in different forms of mental illness. Previous work 
on value based-decision-making in healthy individuals provides exactly the right tools – 
both key theoretical constructs and the laboratory tasks to measure them – needed for this 
effort. Montague and colleagues (2012) have even coined a name for this nascent field, 
“computational psychiatry,” and reviewed some of the early studies employing this 
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research approach (for further qualitative reviews see also Cavedini, Gorini, & Bellini, 
2006; Sevy et al, 2007).  
Although there is reason for excitement about computational psychiatry, there 
also remains significant uncertainty about how fruitful this research strategy might prove 
to be. Most studies have compared a single mental illness population with healthy 
controls. The studies to date often involve small sample sizes, and this lack of power has 
lead to inconsistencies across studies, meaning that it is unclear whether value-based 
decision-making is indeed impaired in mental illness. Furthermore, given that most 
studies only investigate a single clinical group, and different studies use different tasks, it 
is unclear whether some forms of mental illness, compared with others, might 
demonstrate more impairment in value-based decision-making. We conducted 
quantitative meta-analyses to answer these two main questions, namely: (a) whether 
people with mental illness display significantly impaired value-based decision-making 
relative to healthy individuals, and (b) whether there are any differences in value-based 
decision-making across different mental illness populations. The answers to these 
questions should inform the prospects for computational psychiatry – that is, the extent to 
which researchers should study value-based decision-making in mental illness at all, and 
if so, for what mental illnesses these studies might prove most important.  
To answer these questions, our meta-analyses focus on the one task sensitive to 
value-based decision-making processes which has been used widely across all types of 
mental illness, the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; see methods for full description of the 
criteria and search procedure used to select the IGT). The IGT is a standardized 
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instrument that assesses decision-making in ambiguous situations (Bechara, Damasio, 
Damasio, & Anderson, 1994). In the IGT, individuals choose cards from among four 
decks (decks labeled A, B, C and D). Choices from two of the four decks (C and D) result 
in moderate gains as well as moderate losses. Choices from the other two decks (A and 
B) result in much higher gains as well as much higher losses. Consistent choices from 
decks C and D result in a net gain, while consistent choices from decks A and B result in 
a net loss. Thus decks C and D are considered “advantageous” while A and B are 
considered “disadvantageous.” Performance is typically characterized by the number of 
choices of the advantageous decks minus the number of choices of the disadvantageous 
decks. Participants are unaware of these facts and must learn to maximize their monetary 
gain based on the feedback they receive after each choice. Typical performance evolves 
during the course of the task, and most healthy participants make more choices from the 
advantageous decks by the end of the task.  
As this description should make clear, the IGT taps into many different aspects of 
value-based decision-making, including one’s tolerance for risk and ambiguity (Holt & 
Laury, 2002; Ellsburg, 1961; Levy, Snell, Nelson, Rustichini, & Glimcher, 2010), the 
degree to which one weights losses versus gains (Kahenman & Tversky, 1979), and how 
well one learns on the basis of positive and negative feedback (Schönberg, Daw, Joel, & 
O'Doherty, 2007; Vaidya, Knutson, O'Leary, Block, Magnotta, 2007; Pessiglione, 
Seymour, Flandin, Dolan, & Frith, 2006). This limits the IGT’s specificity in terms of the 
target decision process affected (at least, when overall performance is analyzed as in the 
studies we review, as opposed to studies that have used computational modeling to tease 
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apart these various factors, e.g., Ahn, Krawitz, Kim, Busemeyer, & Brown, 2011; 
Fridberg et al., 2010; Weller, Levin, & Bechara, 2010). However, the flip side of this lack 
of specificity is sensitivity to many different aspects of value-based decision-making. 
This sensitivity is useful for our purpose, which is to assess whether value-based 
decision-making processes are impaired at all in mental illness and to compare the degree 
of any impairment broadly across different mental illnesses. The IGT can thus serve to 
screen for potential impairments in value-based decision-making, and therefore provides 
a sensible starting point for the first quantitative comparison of value-based decision 
making across mental illnesses.  
We performed two meta-analyses across all studies that used the IGT to assess 
decision-making in a mental illness population. The first meta-analysis looked at effect 
sizes for comparisons between healthy individuals and those with mental illness. We 
were particularly interested in whether there was a significant effect across all mental 
illnesses, and whether effect sizes reliably differed across disorders. A follow-up meta-
analysis evaluated the raw scores from the IGT across different mental illnesses, rather 
than the differences in performance against matched healthy participants. This meta-
analysis allowed a direct comparison of performance across disorders.  
Methods 
Selection of the IGT 
 Given that our goal was to assess and compare value-based decision-making 
across different forms of mental illness, we first searched for decision-making tasks that 
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had been used widely enough for this purpose. An initial PsychINFO screen through 
February 2011 used decision-making and specific disorders as descriptors (e.g., decision 
making and obsessive compulsive disorder or OCD). This broad search identified three 
value-based decision making tasks that had been widely used in studies of mental illness: 
the IGT, the Delay Discounting Task (DDT), and the Balloon Analogue Risk Task 
(BART). Three further searches were conducted on PsychInfo through February 2011. 
The first search used the following descriptors: Delayed Discounting Task or Kirby Delay 
Discounting Measure or Temporal Discounting Task or Discounting Task or Probability 
Discounting Task. The second search used Balloon Analogue Risk Task or Balloon 
Analogue Risk Taking Task as descriptors. The third search used Iowa Gambling Task or 
IGT as descriptor. All three searches were restricted to search the adult population 
(Keyword = adult). The selection of the final task(s) was based on two criteria – the task 
had been used to assess impairment across mental illness categories (e.g., OCD, mood 
disorder, eating disorder, substance dependence disorder, pathological gambling, 
schizophrenia and personality disorder) and there were at least three independent studies 
assessing impairment within each disorder category by using that task. We felt it was 
important to compare across mental illnesses with the same exact task, since different 
value-based decision-making tasks assess different constructs or combinations of 
constructs.  
From these searches, we found only one task met our criteria: the IGT. Of the 40 
articles reviewed that used the BART, only 3 fulfilled criteria for the present study. Of 
the 149 articles reviewed that used the DDT, only populations with substance 
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abuse/dependence were prominently featured (20 articles). A preliminary review of 282 
articles using the IGT revealed that it would meet our criteria. Although we had hoped to 
compare mental health disorders on more than one task of value-based decision-making, 
the IGT provides a sensible starting point for the first quantitative comparison, as this 
task was used to initially identify both deficits in brain lesion populations and activations 
in functional imaging studies that were later proven relevant to several other tasks that 
assess value-based decision making.  
Search Procedures 
The broad clinical population under investigation prevented the use of specific 
and narrow search terms. Hence the behavioral task of interest, the IGT, was used as a 
search term and the available literature was assessed with respect to clinical pathology. 
Potentially relevant studies were identified via Google Scholar and PsychINFO searches 
through January 2012 using the descriptors Iowa Gambling Task or IGT, restricting the 
search to the adult population (Keyword = adult).  
The database searches were supplemented in several ways to ensure 
comprehensiveness. The reference lists of relevant reviews, chapters, and articles were 
manually searched for potentially eligible studies. The electronic library of one of the 
authors (J.W.K.), who specializes in decision-making, was also searched. From a 
provisional list of included studies, four researchers who frequently publish relevant 
studies were identified, and Google Scholar and PsychInfo searches were performed 
using these authors’ names as search terms. Several steps were also taken to address 
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publication bias. Unpublished dissertations were included in the PsychINFO search. The 
four frequent authors identified above were also contacted and asked if they had any 
unpublished studies pertinent to the research question. One researcher (Davis, 2011) 
provided unpublished data included in the study. Conference abstracts from the Society 
for Neuroeconomics (2005-2012), Society for Neuroscience (2000-2012) and Cognitive 
Neuroscience Society (2003-2012) were also searched. These abstract searches generated 
one additional study (Dolan et al., 2008) that fit all inclusion criteria and was included in 
the final meta-analyses.  
Studies had to meet the following inclusion criteria to be included in either meta-
analysis: 
a) The study was published in English (to ensure proper coding). 
b) The sample consisted only of adult participants. This ensures comparable 
neurodevelopmental baselines across samples.  
c) For mental illness diagnosis, only studies using clinical interview methods based 
on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV; APA, 
1994) guidelines were used. Self-report questionnaires could not be the sole 
source for establishing diagnosis. This helps improve reliability and validity of a 
diagnosis across studies.  
For inclusion in the effect size meta-analysis, studies had to additionally include a 
comparison group of healthy participants, and report sufficient details for an effect size to 
be calculated. For inclusion in the raw score meta-analysis, studies had to include the IGT 
net score means and SDs and/or block IGT scores and means for the clinical group under 
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investigation (See Supplement Material for list of references included in both meta-
analyses).  
Finally, to benchmark the IGT performance of mental illness populations, we 
compared their performance with that of brain lesion populations. Only studies using 
participants with ventromedial prefrontal cortex or frontal cortex lesions were selected; 
studies that included traumatic brain injury (TBI) were excluded. Given their known 
impairment on the IGT (Bechara et al., 1994; Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Lee, 1999; 
Bechara, Tranel, & Damasio, 2000), this group was included as a comparison to assess 
the severity of any deficits in mental illnesses.  
Selection of studies  
 The combined search for both meta-analyses yielded 348 studies, of which 176 
were retained for evaluation for inclusion (See Figure 1 and Figure 2). Of these 176 
studies, six studied lesion populations and were used for comparison with mental illness 
populations. Sixty studies were excluded from both meta-analyses for the following 
reasons: described a study which did not include a clinical population (n = 15), did not 
include the IGT as one of its decision-making assessment tasks (n = 11), did not use 
interview techniques and DSM-IV guidelines to determine mental health diagnosis and/or 
relied on self-report measures (n = 19), were repetitions of the same sample described in 
another study (n = 5), were review or theoretical articles (n = 7), or included a population 
group other than adults (n = 3). For the effect size meta-analysis, 45 additional studies 
were excluded because they did not include a healthy adult comparison group (n = 29) or 
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they reported inadequate data for the calculation of effect sizes (n = 16). For the raw 
score meta-analysis, 69 additional studies were excluded because they reported 
inadequate data for the calculation of performance scores. Thus there were 65 articles, 
comprising 65 studies, that met criteria for the effect size meta-analysis and 41 articles, 
comprising 41 studies, that met criteria for the raw score meta-analysis. When a 
secondary source was available for a given study, the primary source was used to 
calculate the effect size unless reported data were insufficient. For comparison of effects 
sizes, six studies with lesion populations were available. For comparison of raw scores, 
only four of these studies were included as the others provided insufficient data to 
calculate net mean IGT performance and standard errors for lesion group. One author 
(Bechara et al., 1994, 1999, 2000) provided the necessary data for three of the four 
studies.  
Coding of Studies 
 Given that one of our central questions was whether IGT performance varies with 
type of mental illness, studies were coded for both the specific type of primary mental 
health disorder (Obsessive Compulsive Disorders, Mood Disorders, Eating Disorders, 
Schizophrenia, Substance Abuse/Dependence Disorders, Pathological Gambling 
Disorder, and Personality Disorders) and broadly into personality vs. non-personality 
primary disorders. This broad distinction is of interest given the collapsing of Axis I and 
II disorders in the current The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(5th ed.; DSM–5; American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Lack of a difference between 
personality and non-personality disorders would be in alignment with the collapsing of 
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Axis I and II categories in the DSM-5. Studies were also coded for other variables that 
could explain heterogeneity in effects and that were consistently reported in all studies. 
Since intelligence is known to affect value-based decision-making (Burks, Carpenter, 
Goette & Rustichini, 2009), each study was coded for whether an intelligence assessment 
was administered, and if intelligence was assessed, whether there was a significant 
difference between the clinical and healthy groups. Studies were also coded for whether 
the study excluded participants with substance abuse/dependence and whether the study 
excluded participants with traumatic brain injury or other neurological impairment (Dom 
et al., 2005). Comorbidity between mental disorders could be another important factor, as 
could whether individuals with mental health disorders are currently undergoing 
treatment and how long the individuals had been diagnosed with the disorder. 
Unfortunately, none of these factors were consistently reported across studies and so 
these factors could not be examined.  
Independence of Effect Sizes 
 To meet the statistical assumption of independence of effect sizes, we took 
several steps to ensure that each study contributed only one effect size to each set of 
analyses (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). For example, researchers may publish more than one 
article using the same data set or may include data used in a previous publication. Since 
this would violate the independence of effect sizes assumption, authors with multiple 
publications were contacted to provide information on whether completely independent 
clinical samples were recruited if they investigated the same clinical group in more than 
one published article. Further, in studies that included multiple clinical populations and a 
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single healthy control group, only the clinical population with the largest sample size was 
used in the effect size meta-analysis, since including multiple effect sizes calculated from 
the same control group would violate the independence assumption. For studies that 
subdivided their target clinical population into subgroups (for example, alcohol 
dependence with personality disorder and alcohol dependence without personality 
disorder) and reported data for each subgroup, the combined means and SDs for those 
subgroups were calculated to increase sample size and ensure independence of effect 
sizes.  
Meta-analytic Procedures and Analyses 
 Weighted mean effect sizes, heterogeneity analyses and moderator analyses were 
conducted using Comprehensive Meta-Analysis, version 2.2.046 (Borenstein, Hedges, 
Higgins, & Rothstein, 2005). Since the eligible studies used different samples, and 
methodologies, considerable heterogeneity of effects was expected. Fixed effect models 
assume that the true effect size is the same in all studies, and any variability in effect 
sizes between studies is attributed to random error. By contrast, random effects models 
assume that the true effect may vary systematically from study to study. Given the 
expected dispersion of effect sizes, random effects analyses were used to model two 
aspects of the observed variance: random within-study variance and systematic between-
study variance. Each effect size was weighted to account for its relative precision based 
on the standard error of the effect size (within-study variance) and tau-squared (between-
study variance).  
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Effect sizes. Effect sizes for between-group comparisons were coded such that a 
negative effect size indicated impaired decision-making performance in the clinical group 
relative to the control group. Hedge’s g  (Hedges, 1981) was employed as a measure of 
effect size. The conventions typically used to interpret Cohen’s d can also be applied to 
Hedge’s g: an effect size of 0.2 is considered small, 0.5 is considered moderate, and 0.8 is 
considered large  (Cohen, 1988). For studies that did not provide sufficient data for an 
effect size calculation but reported non-significant results, an effect size of zero was 
entered  (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). Given the range of study designs and purposes, 
methodological quality was not quantified or used in the weighting of effect sizes.   
 Raw Scores. For the raw score meta-analysis, performance on the IGT was 
expressed as the number of selections of good decks minus the number of selections of 
bad decks. Mean scores were calculated. Mean performance can range widely, with 
healthy controls typically scoring in the positive range.  
Outliers. Final effect sizes or raw scores  3 SD above or below the weighted 
mean were identified as outliers. Two outliers were detected (Dolan, Bechara & Nathan, 
2007; Dom, de Wilde, Hulstijn & Sabbe, 2007) in the effect size meta-analysis. One 
outlier was detected for the raw score meta-analysis (Maurex et al., 2009). The results 
below are presented excluding the outliers, such that the final effect size meta-analysis 
included 63 studies and the final raw score meta-analysis included 40 studies. The results 
presented here did not differ significantly when the outliers were included. Details of the 
three studies judged as outliers are still provided in Tables 1 and 2 below.  
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Publication bias. Publication bias (also called the “file drawer problem”) presents 
a serious challenge for any meta-analysis. Studies with non-significant findings or small 
effect sizes have a decreased probability of being published, which can result in inflated 
estimates of effect size in meta-analyses of published findings. As detailed above, several 
steps were taken in the initial search stage to reduce the potential effect of publication 
bias (though admittedly these steps recovered only two unpublished studies). 
 We also tested statistically for the effects of publication bias in two ways. First, a 
funnel plot was created and visually examined. This graph plots the standard error for 
each study (determined by the study’s sample size) against the study’s effect size. The 
name “funnel plot” comes from the predicted presence of an inverted funnel. Studies with 
larger sample sizes provide more reliable estimates of the effect size and therefore should 
cluster more tightly around the mean toward the top of the plot, whereas smaller studies 
provide more variable estimates and therefore should scatter more widely around the 
mean toward the bottom of the plot. In the presence of publication bias, the plot becomes 
asymmetrical, typically with fewer small-sample-sized studies than would be predicted 
with effect sizes smaller than the mean. The trim-and-fill procedure was then applied to 
the funnel plot  (Duval & Tweedie, 2000). This procedure calculates the likely number of 
missing studies based on the asymmetry in the funnel plot, and produces an effect size 
and confidence interval that is adjusted to account for these missing studies. An important 
caveat to the use of these procedures is that both funnel plots and the trim-and-fill 
procedure assume homogeneity of effect sizes. Heterogeneous datasets violate this 
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assumption, so the use of these techniques in such cases (which include the present cases) 
should be interpreted with caution.  
Publication bias was also examined using classic fail-safe values (Rosenthal, 
1979). The fail-safe value determines the number of missing studies with a mean effect of 
zero that would need to be added to the analysis before the two-tailed p-value would be 
greater than 0.05. Tolerance levels were also calculated based on the equation 5K+10, 
(where K is the number of observed studies) proposed by Rosenthal (1979) to determine 
what would be considered an unlikely number of non-significant studies.  
Homogeneity of effect sizes. The present dataset was tested for homogeneity of 
effect sizes using the Q statistic  (Hedges & Olkin, 1985) and the I2 statistic  (Cooper, 
2010; Higgins & Thompson, 2002; Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). The Q statistic has a chi-
square distribution and tests whether the observed dispersion is significantly larger than 
the expected dispersion based on within-study error. A significant Q statistic suggests 
that the distribution of effect sizes around the mean is greater than that would be 
predicted from sampling error alone. The I2 statistic estimates the percentage of the 
variance that is attributable to between-studies variability as opposed to within-studies 
sampling error. Generally percentages of I2 = 25, 50, and 75 indicate low, moderate, and 
high degrees of heterogeneity, respectively (Higgins, Thompson, Deeks, & Altman, 
2003).  
Moderator analyses. Given evidence of substantial heterogeneity of effects sizes, 
moderator analyses were conducted on variables that might be associated with study 
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effects and were consistently reported across studies (see “Coding of Studies” above). 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was conducted for categorical moderators using a 
mixed-effects model for each variable hypothesized to influence the effect size. This 
model consisted of a random-effects model, which combined studies within each 
subgroup, and a fixed-effect model that combined subgroups to determine the overall 
effect. Where applicable, the strength of differences based on moderator analyses was 
calculated using Cohen’s d. 
Results 
Sixty-three studies contributed to the effect size meta-analysis and forty studies to 
the raw score meta-analysis. Study and sample characteristics are presented in Tables 1 
and 2 respectively. 
Results for Effect Size Meta-analysis 
The results of the random-effects model for effect size indicate that mental illness 
populations performed reliably worse on IGT than healthy controls, with a moderately 
large effect size. Individual study effect sizes ranged from 0 to –1.55 (negative effect 
sizes indicating impaired performance in the clinical population). The average effect size 
was – 0.58 (95% CI – 0.68, – 0.48, p < 0.001). Cohen’s U3 provides an intuitive metric to 
comprehend the magnitude of this effect size. A magnitude of – 0.58 implies that 73% of 
participants in the clinical population could be expected to perform worse on the IGT 
than the mean performance level of healthy controls (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). 
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Although there was evidence of publication bias, the difference between 
individuals with mental illness and healthy controls was robust to this bias. The fail-safe 
value was 5172, far exceeding the proposed tolerance levels of what would be considered 
an unlikely number of non-significant studies (350). The funnel plot was asymmetric 
(Figure 3) with absence of potential studies on the lower right hand side of the funnel; 
trim-and-fill procedures suggested that 13 studies with effect sizes to the right of the 
mean (more strongly positive) were missing. The corrected average effect size based on 
the trim-and-fill procedure (Duvall & Tweedie, 2000) was – 0.44 (95% CI – 0.55 - – 
0.33).  
We expected heterogeneous effect sizes, since the populations comprised diverse 
mental illnesses. The Q statistic indicated significant heterogeneity among the effect sizes 
(p < 0.001). The I2 value indicated moderate levels of heterogeneity, with 60.71% of the 
variance in effect sizes attributable to between-study variance.  
Since the Q statistic and I2 value indicated significant heterogeneity, an analysis 
of potential moderators was conducted to assess whether effect sizes differed on the basis 
of study characteristics (Table 3). Neither type of mental illness (Q(6) = 4.60, p = 0.60) 
nor personality/other type (Q(1) = 1.79, p = .18, d = .34) was a significant moderator. 
However, in the case of personality/other type, lack of power maybe a potential reason 
for the lack of significant findings. The trend was for the effect size in non-personality 
disorder populations, formerly Axis I disorders, (g = –0.56, n = 60) to be lower than that 
in personality disorder populations, formerly Axis II disorders (g = –0.90, n = 3). 
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A significant moderator of effect size was the assessment of intellectual 
functioning. Studies that did not assess intellectual functioning reported significantly 
more impaired decision-making performance (g = –0.86, n = 13) than studies that did 
assess intellectual functioning (g = –0.51, n = 50) (Q(1) = 8.58, p = 0.003, d = .35). 
Among the 50 studies that assessed intellectual functioning, 18 reported a significant 
difference in intellectual performance between the mental illness group and healthy 
controls. These 18 studies also used intelligence as a covariate in data analysis, which 
may explain why there was no difference in effect size between studies reporting a 
significant difference in intellectual functioning (g = –0.53, n = 18) and studies reporting 
no difference (g = –0.50, n = 32), (Q(1) =.12, p = 0.72, d = .03).  
Neither substance use exclusion (Q(1) = .02, p = 0.90, d = .02) nor exclusion for 
TBI (Q(1) = .005, p = .94, d = .02) was found to be a significant moderator of effect 
sizes.  
Finally, we compared the performance of individuals with mental illness to those 
with frontal lobe lesions. We combined the 63 mental illness studies with six studies 
involving frontal lesion groups, and did a moderator analysis with type of clinical 
population as a moderator (lesion vs. mental illness). Type of clinical population proved 
to be a significant moderator (Q(1) = 6.57, p = 0.01, d = .52) with the lesion population 
performing significantly worse than the mental illness population. Thus, although the 
mental illness group performed significantly worse than the healthy control group, their 
deficits were not as large as those with frontal lobe lesions (See Figure 5 for comparison 
of the non-personality disorder, personality disorder and lesion groups).  
 
24 
 
Results for Raw Score Meta-analysis 
Performance on the IGT was quantified as the number of “good” deck choices (C 
+ D) minus the number of “bad” deck choices (A + B). For a 100 trials this score can 
therefore vary from –100 to 100. Despite high variability in net IGT scores across 
populations, the mean net IGT score for healthy controls is usually a high net positive 
gain, on the order of 20 (Bechara et al., 1994), with higher scores implying better value-
based decision making strategies. Mean performances for the mental illness population in 
individual studies ranged from –6.72 to 10.20. The average performance across all 40 
studies was .45 (S.E = .88).  
Though there was evidence of publication bias (Figure 4), this did not seem to 
have a large effect on mean performance estimates. Trim-and-fill procedures suggested 
that 15 studies with raw scores to the right of mean (more strongly positive) were 
missing. The corrected average performance was 3.74 (95% CI – 1.93 - – 5.54).  
There was evidence for heterogeneity in effects across studies. The Q statistic 
indicated significant heterogeneity (p < 0.001). The I2 value indicated high levels of 
heterogeneity, with 83.70% of the variance in raw scores attributable to between-study 
variance. As both statistics indicated heterogeneity, we again conducted analyses of 
potential moderators (Table 4). However, type of mental illness (n = 40) did not explain 
the heterogeneity in the IGT mean score (Q (6) = 2.32, p = 0.90). Personality disorders 
vs. non-personality disorders did not moderate the effect either (Q (1) = .38, p = 0.54, d = 
.84). The direction of the difference was similar to the trend observed in the effect size 
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meta-analysis, with non-personality disorder populations (g = 0.57, n = 38) performing 
better on the IGT than personality disorder populations (g = – 2.33, n = 2).  
Finally, we compared the performance of individuals with mental illness to those 
with frontal lobe lesions. We combined the 40 studies of mental illness with four studies 
involving lesion groups and conducted a moderator analysis with type of clinical 
population as a moderator (lesion vs. mental illness). Type of clinical population proved 
to be a significant moderator (Q (1) = 23.35, p < 0.001, d = 6.62) with the populations 
with lesions again performing significantly worse than did the population with mental 
illness.  
Discussion 
 This quantitative review answers two broad questions. The first is whether or not 
individuals with mental illness demonstrate impaired value-based decision-making, as 
assessed by the IGT, relative to healthy individuals. The effect size meta-analysis 
demonstrated that performance on the IGT is significantly impaired in mental illness 
populations, though the effect size is moderate and the deficit not as severe as in the 
frontal lesion population. The second question is whether, within the mental illness 
group, the severity of impairment differs across types of mental illness. Since different 
matched comparison groups might be used for different mental illnesses, the second 
meta-analysis, which directly compares the raw scores on the IGT in different mental 
illnesses, provides the clearest answer to this question. Surprisingly, the raw score meta-
analysis did not demonstrate any significant differences based on type of mental illness.  
 
26 
 
The finding that value-based decision-making is significantly impaired in mental 
illness may not come as a surprise to most readers. Qualitative reviews of decision-
making behavior in specific disorders, such as schizophrenia (Sevy et al., 2007), 
obsessive-compulsive disorder (Chamberlain et al., 2007), and substance use disorder 
(Dom et al., 2005) all align with the present findings. However, qualitative reviews can 
fall prey to selection or publication bias, factors that careful, quantitative meta-analyses 
can address. To our knowledge, the present study is the first quantitative meta-analysis to 
verify that value-based decision-making, as measured by any task, is consistently 
impaired in mental illness. 
The present study is also novel in comparing value-based decision-making 
performance across different mental illnesses. At present, only the IGT has been tested in 
a wide enough range of disorders to permit such a comparison. Here our findings are 
perhaps more surprising: we do not find strong evidence for differential impairment on 
the IGT in different mental illnesses. Diagnosis was not a significant moderator in either 
the effect size or the raw score meta-analyses. Before we return to potential explanations 
for this lack of differential impairment, we first discuss two potential moderators that we 
did observe.  
There was significant heterogeneity in size of IGT impairment across studies. 
Despite this heterogeneity, however, neither diagnosis nor personality vs. non-personality 
type moderated IGT performance in the mental illness group. There was, however, a 
trend in both the effect size meta-analysis and the raw score meta-analysis for people 
with personality disorders to be more impaired on the IGT than people with other 
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disorders. These findings should be interpreted with caution given that only three studies 
of personality disorders were included in the first meta-analysis and only two studies 
were included in the second. However, future studies focusing on value-based decision-
making in personality disorders are warranted given the trend in the current findings. The 
current findings point to the possibility that people with personality disorders may 
experience more severe impairment than those with other disorders. This would be in line 
with the fact that personality disorders are more chronic and treatment resistant, while 
non-personality disorders usually have a more sudden onset and less prolonged time 
course. In fact, the IGT impairment in the small number of personality disorder studies in 
our meta-analyses was almost as large as that observed in patients with frontal lobe 
lesions, and individual studies of borderline personality disorder and antisocial 
personality disorder have uncovered large effects on learning from rewards or 
punishments (Rilling, King-Casas, & Sanfey, 2008). Given the comorbidity between 
personality disorders and non-personality disorders, our findings also demonstrate the 
importance of assessing and reporting comorbidity in future work. Indeed, it is possible 
that the IGT impairments observed in people with non-personality disorders in the current 
meta-analyses are due in part to comorbid personality disorders.  
The second potential moderator, which was significant in the effect size meta-
analysis was assessment of general intellectual functioning. Studies assessing intellectual 
functioning reported smaller levels of IGT impairment than studies that did not assess 
intellectual functioning. Within the studies that did assess intellectual functioning, there 
was no difference in the size of IGT impairment between studies that observed a 
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significant difference in intellectual functioning and those studies that did not find such a 
difference. This is likely because in those studies that did establish a significant 
difference, intellectual functioning was used as a covariate while assessing IGT 
performance. Thus, when intellectual functioning is not assessed and controlled for, the 
degree of decision-making impairment on the IGT appears to be inflated. These findings 
suggest that the IGT is sensitive to not just to value-based decision-making processes, but 
also to general intellectual abilities. In fact, several researchers have previously suggested 
that deficits on the IGT might reflect deficits in basic cognitive abilities like working 
memory (Hinson, Jameson, & Whitney, 2002; Jameson, Hinson, & Whitney, 2004). 
These findings illustrate the importance of assessing and controlling for intellectual 
functioning in studies of value-based decision-making. It is critical to note, however, that 
even when assessing and controlling for intellectual functioning, impairment on the IGT 
is observed in mental illness.  
Returning to our central finding, why might there be widespread impairments on 
the IGT across all mental illnesses, with no significant evidence for differential 
impairments? While this null result (i.e., lack of differential impairment) should be 
interpreted with caution, a plausible interpretation arises from recognizing the central 
limitation of the current study. The IGT is only one measure, and while this measure is 
sensitive to many different processes involved in value-based decision-making (as well as 
to some general aspects of intellectual functioning, see above), it is not specific for any 
single decision process (Buelow & Sur, 2009). The decision literature distinguishes 
between many fine-grained decision processes, including aversion to risk, aversion to 
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ambiguity, aversion to loss, and the ability to learn from rewards and punishments 
(Schönberg et al., 2007; Vaidya et al., 2007; Pessiglione et al., 2006). Changes in any of 
these processes could have effects on IGT performance. Indeed, different groups have 
attributed poor IGT performance to a deficit in reversal learning (Fellows, 2007, Fellows 
& Farah, 2005), a preference for taking risks (Dunn, Dalgleish, & Lawrence, 2006), or 
insensitivity to either rewards or punishments (Franken & Muris, 2005). While it is 
possible that the impairments observed across different mental illnesses in the current 
study are all traceable back to the same underlying process within value-based decision 
making, it seems more likely that different mental illnesses impact different decision 
processes, but all of these effects lead to poorer performance on the IGT. Our findings 
therefore show that across mental illnesses there is impairment within the broad class of 
processes involved in value-based decision making to which the IGT is sensitive, but 
these findings do not yet identify the specific processes within that broad class that are 
affected by specific disorders. 
A very promising avenue of future research, then, would be to assess decision-
making in different mental illnesses using a wider range of tasks that more cleanly isolate 
specific decision processes. Studies could use a battery of tasks developed in the decision 
literature to assess the specific processes of risk aversion, ambiguity aversion, loss 
aversion, reward learning and punishment learning. To focus on two of these constructs, 
people might perform poorly on the IGT because they have a lower degree of risk 
aversion (Holt & Laury, 2002; Levy et al., 2010). That is, even once they know the 
probabilities and the outcomes associated with each deck, they are more willing to choose 
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the higher-risk (i.e., higher variance) disadvantageous decks. Alternatively, people might 
perform poorly on the IGT because they are slower to learn from rewards and 
punishments (Schönberg et al., 2007; Vaidya et al., 2007; Pessiglione et al., 2006). That 
is, it takes them a longer time to learn the probabilities and the outcomes associated with 
each deck. The decision tasks necessary to dissociate these two possibilities already exist.  
In addition, performance on many of these more fine-grained decision tasks has 
been associated with specific neural systems. For example, neuroimaging studies using 
standard tasks to assess people’s risk preferences have identified neural responses that 
scale with risk in the cingulate cortex, anterior insula, and inferior prefrontal cortex, and 
these neural responses predict an individual’s degree of risk aversion (Christopoulos, 
Tobler,  Bossaerts, Dolan, & Schultz, 2009; Rudorf, Preuschoff, & Weber, 2012). In 
contrast, individual differences in reward learning have also been identified and these are 
associated with neural signals in the ventral striatum that scale with reward prediction 
errors (Schönberg et al., 2007).  
Therefore, a carefully selected battery of tasks, unlike the IGT alone, would be 
capable of identifying the specific “signature” of decision processes affected by a given 
mental illness. Comparing these signatures across mental illnesses would then permit 
identifying their commonalities and distinguishing features, and would furthermore lead 
to testable hypotheses about the neural systems affected by mental illness. Such 
investigations might start with those mental illnesses for which there are strong effects in 
the current meta-analyses, such as mood or personality disorders. This kind of study 
would fall squarely within the current push in clinical psychopathology towards 
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transdiagnostic investigations of specific psychological processes. Although such a 
research effort would warrant a sizable investment, the current meta-analyses suggest that 
such an investment would be highly likely to yield interesting, informative results.  
In this light, the current meta-analyses provide a broad “screen” for possible 
impairments in value-based decision-making, by assessing IGT performance across 
mental illnesses. The obvious next step, given the widespread impairments on the IGT 
that we document, is to follow up on this “screen” to identify the specific decision 
processes that are impaired in specific disorders. Impaired decision-making is generally 
not a focus in psychopathology. Indeed, the DSM-5 (APA, 2013) considers decision-
making impairment a possible symptom for only one disorder, major depressive disorder. 
The current meta-analyses suggest that further investigations of value-based decision-
making in mental illness, along the lines followed in the nascent field of computational 
psychiatry (Montague et al., 2012), hold substantial promise for identifying specific 
decision processes that are adversely affected across disorders.  
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CHAPTER 2: THE DISCRIMINATORY POWER OF DECISION-MAKING: CAN 
VALUE-BASED DECISION-MAKING PREDICT AND DETECT IMPAIRED 
PROCESSES IN DEPRESSION? 
 
Abstract 
Incongruities between research in the biological science and clinical psychology 
fields validate the need to investigate underlying process-based mechanisms of mental 
illness. One theoretically and empirically studied cognitive process worth exploring is 
decision-making. The present study aims to assess value-based decision-making in a 
clinically depressed population with three objectives: First, to assess potential differences 
in decision-making in depressed individuals compared to healthy controls; second, to 
identify potential underlying latent factors of decision-making; and third, to determine the 
predictive accuracy of decision performance as a potential diagnostic tool. 
Method: 128 individuals (64 clinically depressed and 64 healthy controls) were 
recruited. Each participant was administered a structured clinical interview, value-based 
decision tasks, an IQ test and several self-report questionnaires. The decision tasks used 
were risk aversion, ambiguity aversion, delay discounting, persistence, reward and 
punishment learning, the ultimatum game, and the prediction question. Independent t-
tests were conducted to detect differences between the two groups. Exploratory factor 
analysis using promax rotation was conducted to identify potential underlying factors of 
decision-making. Logistic regression, including out-of-sample prediction, was used to 
estimate the prediction accuracy of decision performance to classify depressed and 
healthy individuals.  
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Results: Depressed participants performed significantly worse on the punishment-
learning task (p = 0.001, d = .58) and reward learning task (p = .05, d = .37), were more 
impatient on the persistence task (p = 0.008, d = .39), made significantly less 50-50 
choices in the ambiguity aversion task (p = .04, d =.36), accepted significantly less 
money as a responder (p =.03, d =.38) and proposed significantly more as a proposer (p 
=.04, d =.52) in the ultimatum game. The depressed group believed they had a 
significantly lower probability of winning additional money than the control group (p = 
.01, d = .44).  Four underlying factors were identified based on decision performance – 
myopic decision-making, persistence, uncertainty and pessimism bias. An out of sample 
logistic regression using depression task scores as predictors showed a predictive 
accuracy of 62%.  
Conclusion: Depressed individuals’ decision-making performance was 
significantly different from healthy controls across a range of decision tasks. Potential 
factors of the decision process were identified and with prediction results showed 
learning and pessimism bias as signature behaviors of depression. Decision tasks are 
outperformed by self-report measures as predictive diagnostic tools. Overall results 
suggest decision tasks are better suited to identify specific processes gone awry rather 
than diagnostic prediction. 
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The Discriminatory Power of Decision-Making: Can Value-Based Decision-Making 
Predict and Detect Impaired Processes in Depression? 
 
How depression impacts decision-making is potentially important to our 
understanding of both decision making and psychopathology. As depression affects 6.7% 
of the US adult population in a year  (Kessler, Wai, Demler, & Walters, 2005), it could 
account for sizable heterogeneity across individual decision makers, and would therefore 
be of interest to economists or others interested in that heterogeneity. In addition, as 
depression is associated with both baseline changes in affect as well as changes in 
affective reactivity, the effects of depression on decision-making provide important data 
about how affective factors influence decision-making (Bechara, 2003; Bechara, 2004; 
Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000; Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, & 
Cohen, 2003a; Schwarz, 2000). Thus, understanding how depressed people make 
monetary decisions can advance economics and decision science.  
Understanding how depressed people make monetary decisions can also advance 
psychopathology. As illustrated for example by the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC)  
(Insel et al., 2010), there is increasing emphasis in psychopathology research on a 
nuanced understanding of the processes and mechanisms affected by mental illness, 
rather than only superficial clinical symptoms. Decision processes are likely an important 
and understudied target for these investigations. For example, a recent meta-analysis of 
mental illness and decision-making on one task, the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), 
demonstrated impaired decision making performance across mental illnesses  
(Mukherjee, & Kable, 2014). In addition, the brain regions affected in psychopathology – 
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the frontal lobe and associated subcortical structures including the striatum and amygdala 
– are the same as those implicated in decision-making behavior. Depression in particular 
is associated with impaired functioning in ventromedial prefrontal cortex and ventral 
striatum, two regions known to play critical roles in value-based decision-making  
(Rangel, Camerer, & Montague, 2008). Using the conceptual and analytical tools of 
decision science to study depression could help to bridge gaps between current research 
in clinical psychopathology and neuroscience and behavioral science  (Montague, Dolan, 
Friston, & Dayan, 2012).  
Though several studies have begun to investigate decision making in depression, a 
review of the literature highlights some noteworthy gaps. First, we do not have a full 
characterization of how value-based decision-making differs in depressed and non-
depressed individuals. Studies have demonstrated differences in value-based decision-
making in depressed individuals on isolated tasks, such as the IGT (Must et al., 2006) or 
reward learning. But the full range of decision processes has not yet been surveyed. Are 
all aspects of decision-making affected or just some subcomponents? Do depressed 
decision makers differ in how they treat uncertainty, delay, or social demands?  
Second, given that no study has investigated multiple decision processes in the 
same individuals with depression, we do not know yet where the biggest differences in 
decision making are between depressed and non-depressed individuals. Looking across a 
range of decision tasks could potentially identify and isolate the dimensions of the 
decision making processes that are most affected in depressed individuals.  
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Finally, we do not know how well we can successfully categorize depressed from 
healthy individuals based on decision performance. There is excitement about the 
emerging field of “computational psychiatry”  (Montague et al., 2012), including the 
prospects for using a combination of behavioral tasks and computational models to 
predict and classify disorders.  One study (Huys, Vogelstein, & Dayan, 2008) examined 
the potential of a learning task to classify depressed individuals from healthy controls. 
The results demonstrated significant potential. However, no studies have examined the 
extent of the predictive accuracy of multiple decision tasks together. How much of the 
depression “signal” can measures of decision making detect? 
The present study seeks to address these three broad questions. How does value-
based decision making differ in depressed individuals? Are some dimensions/factors of 
decision-making impacted more by depression than others? Finally, what is the predictive 
accuracy of decision-making as a diagnostic tool? To address these three questions we 
administered a battery of value-based decision making tasks to a sample of depressed and 
healthy control individuals. The selected tasks measured delayed discounting (Ainslie & 
Herrnstein, 1981), willingness to wait (WTW)/ persistence  (McGuire & Kable, 2012), 
risk tolerance (Holt & Laury, 2002), ambiguity tolerance (Fox & Tversky, 1995), reward 
and punishment learning (Murphy, Michael, Robbins, & Sahakian, 2003), and social 
preferences using the ultimatum game (Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 
2003).  
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Methods 
Participants  
Between October 2012 and January 2014, 128 participants (64 diagnosed with 
current Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) and 64 healthy controls) were recruited for 
the study. MDD participants were recruited from the Department of Psychiatry and 
Behavioral Health, the Counseling and Psychological Services and the Hospital of the 
University of Pennsylvania. A small subset of these individuals (12) agreed to be taped 
during the diagnostic interview for reliability purposes. Diagnostic reliability was not 
ascertained for the purposes of the present study as more than 80% of the individuals who 
participated were being referred after being given a primary diagnosis of MDD for 
another clinical study at Penn. Healthy control participants were recruited primarily from 
the staff at the University of Pennsylvania and the community through flyers. Based on 
an initial phone screen for depression, participants were invited for a diagnostic interview 
and participation in the study provided they met criteria. MDD participants were enrolled 
if they met the following criteria: (1) diagnostic criteria for current MDD; (2) no history 
of substance abuse/dependence in the past 6 months; and (3) no history of bipolar 
disorder and/or psychotic episodes. Diagnostic criteria were determined based on the 
Structured Clinical Interview for Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 
Fourth Edition (SCID/DSM-IV) (APA, 1994). Inclusion criteria for controls included 
absence of current or past psychiatric illness, as assessed by the SCID, and absence of 
any psychotropic medications. 
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Groups did not differ with respect to gender, education, ethnicity, age, or IQ 
(Table 5). Participants in the MDD sample were moderately to severely depressed, with 
an average mean score of 30.03 (SD = 10.46) on the Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-
II;  (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996)). The mean BDI-II score for control participants was 
2.9 (SD = 4.32). Within the MDD group, 41% were currently on medication and 52% 
were currently in treatment for depression. 
Procedure 
All participants provided written consent after receiving a study description. The 
study was approved by the Institutional Review Board at the University of Pennsylvania. 
The clinical interview and study procedures were conducted by a master’s-level trained 
clinical psychologist (DM). For their participation, participants received $30 for the two 
hour study and possible additional payment based on their responses to one of the eight 
tasks. The additional payment was to ensure that the tasks had real consequences for the 
participants. The task chosen for additional payment was randomly selected, and 
participants were informed of the payment procedures prior to performance of each task. 
The sequence of administration was: (1) the structured clinical interview, (2) the eight 
decision-making tasks, with the order counterbalanced across participants according to a 
Latin-square design, (3) the similarities and matrix reasoning subtests of the Wechsler 
Abbreviated Intelligence Scale (WASI; Wechsler, 1999); (4) five self-report 
questionnaires; and (5) the additional payment prediction questions.  
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After completion of all the tasks, the participant rolled an eight-sided die to select 
one of the eight tasks for additional payment. For the delay discounting, risk tolerance 
and ambiguity tolerance tasks, one trial was selected for payment by rolling a 100-sided 
die, and participants were paid according to their choice on that trial. In the delay 
discounting task, participants were given an amazon gift card on the same day of 
participation but activation of the gift card depended on chosen delay (in days) for the 
chosen amount. For all other tasks, payment was made in cash. If participants selected the 
gamble in the risk tolerance task, a coin was tossed to determine whether they won or 
lost. For the ambiguity tolerance task, participants drew a slip of paper from the envelope 
they selected and were paid if they drew the winning color. Participants knew that one 
envelope contained 50 red and 50 blue slips of paper, while the other contained at least 
25 red and at least 25 blue slips (unknown to the participant there were 49 red slips and 
51 blue slips of paper). For the reward learning, punishment learning, and persistence 
tasks, participants were paid the total amount they won. For the ultimatum game, the 
participants played with actual anonymous players whose responses had already been 
collected. For the proposer role, the participant chose one of several responder envelopes 
presented to him/her. The envelopes contained the responses of an anonymous person to 
the responder role of the ultimatum game. If the anonymous responder accepted the 
proposal offered by the participant, the money was divided according to the participant’s 
proposal. A corresponding compensation method was employed for the responder role 
task. 
Measures 
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Clinical Measures. Inclusion and exclusion diagnostic criteria were based on the 
SCID. Depression severity was assessed with the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI- II;  
Beck et al., 1996). Current medication and psychotherapy treatment assessment was 
based on self-report.  
Self-Report Measures. Several self-report measures were used to assess constructs 
of depression. The self-report measures used were the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale 
(RSES;  (Rosenberg, 1965), the Cognitive Behavioral Avoidance Scale (CBAS;  
Ottenbreit & Dobson, 2004), the Behavioral Inhibition and Behavioral Activation Scale 
(BIS/BAS;  Carver & White, 1994), and the Snaith Hamilton Pleasure Scale (SHAPS; 
Snaith et al., 1995). Additional measures of anxiety and depression included the Beck 
Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck & Steer, 1990) and the Depression, Anxiety and Stress 
Scale (Dass; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1992). 
Cognitive Measures. The Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence - Second 
Edition (WASI–II; Wechsler, 1999) was used as a brief, reliable measure of cognitive 
ability. For the purpose of efficiency, two subtests (matrix reasoning and similarities) of 
the WASI were implemented on each participant to obtain a full scale IQ score.  
Value-Based Decision-Making Tasks 
For the computerized ambiguity, risk tolerance and delay discounting tasks, the 
participant had two practice trial runs prior to the task. On making a choice for a trial, the 
task automatically moved on to the next trial. Should the participant not make a choice 
within 10 seconds, it automatically moved on to the next trial. Each trial was followed by 
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a 2-sec inter-trial interval (ITI). For the present report we focus on metrics that make the 
least assumptions, but we also calculated more theoretically driven measures for risk 
aversion (power utility function exponent), ambiguity tolerance (also a power function 
taking the effect of ambiguity of the perceived probability into account) and delay 
discounting (discount rates) and obtained similar results. Description of each task 
follows:  
Risk Tolerance Task. The task is used to measure a participant’s degree of risk 
tolerance. The task consisted of 51 choices. In each trial, participants were presented with 
the option of choosing either a smaller guaranteed amount of money or a 50% chance of 
winning a larger amount of money. For example, “would you choose a 50% chance of 
winning $35 or a sure amount of $5?” The expected value of the risky option (probability 
of winning times amount) could either be higher or lower than the safe amount. 
Performance was measured in percentage of safe options chosen.  
Ambiguity Tolerance Task. The task is used to measure a participant’s degree of 
ambiguity tolerance. The task consists of 66 choices. In each trial, participants are asked 
to choose between a gamble where the chances of winning are known to be 50% (risky) 
versus a gamble where the chances of winning are not known exactly (ambiguous). The 
amount won for the risky gamble is always equal to or lesser than the ambiguous gamble. 
Performance was measured in percentage of risky gambles chosen.  
Delay Discounting Task. The task is used to measure the extent to which a 
participant discounts delayed rewards. The task consisted of 51 choices. Each choice was 
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between a smaller monetary reward available immediately and a larger monetary reward 
received after a delay period (in days). For example, “Would you prefer $10 now or $15 
in 7 days?” Performance was calculated in percentage of now options chosen. 
Persistence or Willingness to Wait (WTW) Task. In the persistence task, decision 
makers face the problem of optimizing persistence (in the form of waiting for a higher 
monetary reward) appropriately to their environment.  The task is divided into two 
blocks, A and B. In block A, persistence leads to a higher reward, whereas in block B, 
continued persistence if the reward has not arrived by a certain point is suboptimal (see 
(McGuire, & Kable, 2012 for details). A yellow light would stay lit for a specific duration 
(depending on whether Block A or B condition) before delivering a 30¢ reward. 
Participants could choose to wait by leaving the mouse cursor in a box marked, “Wait for 
30¢.”Alternatively, by shifting to a box marked “Take 2¢,” participants could receive 2¢ 
and proceed to a new trial. Each outcome (30¢ or 2¢) was followed by a 2-sec inter-trial 
interval (ITI). The cursor could remain in either box across multiple trials. The task was 
divided into two blocks (A and B), each lasting seven minutes (total duration 14 min), 
and the screen continuously displayed the time remaining and total earned. The optimal 
strategy for block A was to wait for the 30¢, while the optimal strategy for block B was 
to wait for the 30¢ reward for 5 secs and then take the 2¢ if the large reward had not 
arrived.  
Individual trials provide different amounts of information about participants’ 
willingness to wait. Quit trials are the most informative, providing a direct estimate of the 
limit on a participant’s willingness to persist. When the reward is delivered, however, we 
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observe only that the person was willing to wait at least the duration of the trial. We 
accommodate this situation using statistical methods from survival analysis. Analyses 
assessed how long a trial would “survive” without the participant quitting.  
We constructed a Kaplan-Meier empirical survival curve from each participant’s 
responses. For each time t, the curve plots the probability of the participant waiting at 
least until t, provided that the reward was not delivered earlier. Analyses were restricted 
to the 0–11 sec interval common to the two conditions. The area under the survival curve 
(AUC) is a useful summary statistic, representing the average number of seconds an 
individual was willing to wait within the analyzed interval. Someone who never quit 
earlier than 11 sec would have an AUC of 11. One who was willing to wait up to 3 sec on 
half the trials and up to 9 sec on the other half would have an AUC of 6.  
Reward Learning Task. In this task, participants choose between two distinct 
fractal stimuli, which are positioned randomly at two static locations (left and right of the 
central white dot) on screen. On each trial, participants respond by pressing a button on a 
keyboard to choose between the two fractals. The fractals are probabilistically rewarded; 
with the “richer” fractal rewarded 70% of the time and the “poorer” fractal rewarded 30% 
of the time. Positive feedback was provided if a fractal is rewarded (picture of a coin); 
otherwise, neutral feedback was provided (a red dot; indicating no coin). Participants 
were not informed of the specific underlying reward structure of the task. However, they 
were informed that on any given trial, one fractal had a higher likelihood of delivering a 
reward and this association reverses periodically throughout the task. All participants 
completed 4 trials as practice before proceeding to do a full run of 90 trials. Switches take 
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place after 30 trials; hence, there are two switches in total. Each reward has a monetary 
value of 25¢. At the end of the task, the screen displayed the total number of quarters the 
participant won. In this task the proportion of choosing the richer fractal image (i.e., had 
the higher probability of positive feedback) was calculated for each participant.  
Punishment Learning Task. This task is similar to the reward learning task, except 
the goal for the participant is to avoid choosing the fractal leading to punishment 
feedback (red cross overlaying a coin). Participants are informed that at any given point, 
one fractal image leads to more losses than the other and that this will switch 
periodically. The participant starts the task with $22.50 and each time the participant 
chooses the fractal image followed by punishment feedback, 25¢ is deducted from the 
total amount. Like the reward task, participants do a 4 trial practice, before proceeding to 
do a full run of 90 trials, with two reversals. On completion of the task, the screen 
displays the total number of quarters the participant lost. Here the proportion of choosing 
the richer fractal image (i.e., had the higher probability of no-punishment feedback) was 
calculated for each participant. 
Ultimatum Game, Proposer. Participants read the instructions and completed a 
practice quiz to ensure they understood the rules of the game. They were instructed that 
the game involved two people, the participant was the proposer and an anonymous person 
was the responder. They were informed the anonymous responder was a real person 
whose responses had already been recorded. As the proposer, the participant had $10 and 
could divide this money any way s/he wished to between himself/herself and the 
anonymous responder. The anonymous responder had the right to either accept or reject 
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the proposal. Should the proposal be accepted, the money would be divided the way the 
proposer decided to divide the money. However, if the proposal was rejected, neither the 
proposer nor the responder received any money.  
Ultimatum Game, Responder. In this task, the participant played the responder’s 
role in the ultimatum game. The participant decided whether s/he would accept or reject 
each possible proposal an anonymous proposer could make. Should the participant accept 
the proposer’s division, the money would be divided accordingly.  
Winning Probability or Prediction Question. Each participant responded to this 
questionnaire at the end of the study, prior to knowing whether or not they received 
additional payment. The questionnaire states, “You have now completed all the required 
tasks. One item will be randomly picked from one of the tasks you have performed. You 
may or may not receive additional money based on your response. What do you think are 
the chances that you will win additional money (in addition to the $30 for participation) 
on a scale of 0 – 100%? If you think you have an above 0% chance of winning, then how 
much do you think you will win in the range of $0-$100?”  
Statistical Analysis 
Power analysis using G*Power 3.1.2 indicated that a total of 84 participants are 
necessary to detect a conservatively estimated correlation= 0.30 with α = 0.05 and β = 
0.80 between the behavioral decision-making task and self-report measure for a specific 
component of depression (Faul et al., 2009). Power analysis using G*Power 3.1.2 
determined a total of 76 participants are required to detect a moderately estimated 
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correlation = 0.40 with α = 0.05 and β = 0.80, for behavioral tasks to predict overall 
depression using the BDI (number of regressors = 5). The current study included a total 
sample size of 128 individuals (64 clinically depressed and 64 healthy controls) 
exceeding the required 84 participants based on the power analysis. 
 Statistical analyses were performed using SPSS 21.0 and MATLAB 8.2. All tests 
were two-sided. We first compared groups on demographic and clinical characteristics 
using independent t-tests, one-way ANOVA and chi-square tests (Table 5). Independent 
t-tests were conducted to test significance for performance differences on each task 
between the two groups.  
Factor Analysis.  
To determine underlying latent factors captured by behavioral performance and 
self-reports, two separate factor analyses were conducted on the decision task 
performance and the self-report data using principal axis factoring using promax 
rotations. We also conducted a parallel analysis (Horn, 1965) to determine the number of 
factors to extract. Parallel analysis involves comparing the eigenvalues from the sample 
being analyzed to those of a randomly generated sample with the same characteristics as 
the sample of interest (i.e., same number of observations and variables). Factors for 
which the eigenvalues from the sample of interest exceed the corresponding eigenvalues 
from the random sample should be retained (Horn, 1965). 
Decision Making Factor Analysis. The data was screened for univariate outliers. 
The minimum amount of data for factor analysis was satisfied, with a final sample size of 
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116 (using listwise deletion), providing a ratio of over 11 cases per variable. The Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was .54, just above the recommended value 
of .5 and Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant (χ2 (45) = 149.94, p < .001). The 
diagonals of the anti-image correlation matrix were all over .5 and the communalities 
were all above .3.    
Self-report Factor Analysis. The data was screened for univariate outliers. The 
minimum amount of data for factor analysis was satisfied, with a final sample size of 125 
(using listwise deletion), providing a ratio of over 12.5 cases per variable. The Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was .88, above the recommended value of .5 
and Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant (χ2 (45) = 912.15, p < .001). The diagonals 
of the anti-image correlation matrix were over .5 and the communalities were all above 
.3.   
Logistic Regression and Out of Sample Prediction.  
To determine the predictive power of decision tasks relative to self-reports, 
logistic regression was conducted with raw scores and factor scores (from the factor 
analysis) for both the decision tasks and self-report measures. To quantify the accuracy of 
the raw score logistic models, out of sample predictions were assessed for both decision 
tasks and self-report. Each logistic model was tested through multiple iterations on out-
of-sample individuals to estimate average correct predictive percentage. The logistic 
model parameters are calculated based on N number of randomly selected participants 
from the study (training set data). The multinomial logistic regression function in 
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MATLAB is used to calculate the model parameters. The parameters are then tested on 
the remaining participants, called test data (M – N), where M is the size of the entire data 
set. For the same N, the training data set is varied so that every participant is part of the 
test data set exactly once. We used M = 116 and N = 16. The process is repeated for 20 
runs for the same value of N but for different combinations of training data set and test 
data set. The percentage of correctly classified participants in the test data set are 
calculated and averaged over the 20 runs.  
Results 
Demographic Characteristics  
The groups were similar in their demographic characteristics (Table 5). The 
depressed group did not differ from the healthy control group with respect to age, gender, 
ethnicity or education (p values > .31). The two groups did not differ in cognitive ability 
(p =.35, t = .94). As expected, the MDD group reported significantly higher BDI-II scores 
than the healthy control group (p < .001, t = 19.33, d = 3.42). 
Value Based Decision Making Performance 
As compared to the healthy control group, the MDD group demonstrated 
significantly different decision-making on several value-based decision tasks (Table 6). 
In the punishment (t = 3.25, p = .001, d = .58) and reward (t = 1.98, p = .05, d = .37) 
learning reversal tasks, the depressed group made significantly fewer rich choices than 
the controls. In the ultimatum game, the depressed group offered significantly less money 
than the controls in the role of proposer (t = 2.10, p = .03, d = .38) and accepted 
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significantly less money in the role of responder ( t = 2.17, p = .04, d = .52). In the 
prediction questionnaire, depressed participants reported a significantly lower expectation 
of winning additional money than healthy controls (t = 2.50, p = .01, d = .44), although 
the two groups did not differ in the amount of money they expected to win (average 
expectation = $35.50, SD = 22.52). In the ambiguity tolerance task, the MDD group 
made significantly less risky choices i.e., more ambiguous choices than healthy controls 
(t = 2.03, p = .05, d = .36). In the WTW task, MDD participants showed a reduced 
willingness to wait in block A, where the optimal strategy is to persist until the reward 
arrives (t = 2.22, p = .03, d = .39). The two groups did not differ in the number of safe 
options chosen in the risk tolerance task, the number of now options chosen in the delay 
discounting task, or in their willingness to wait in block B of the WTW task (p values > 
.36). 
Factor Analysis  
 Two factor analyses were conducted on the data from the behavioral decision-
making tasks and the self-report measures to determine underlying latent factors. 
Decision-Making Tasks. An exploratory factor analysis using principal axis 
factoring with promax rotations was conducted, with four factors explaining 40.16% of 
the variance (Table 7).  The parallel analysis indicated a three-factor solution best 
described the structure of the decision variables (Table 8). The scree plot indicates the 
presence of at least four factors (Figure 6). Since the factor analysis and the scree plot 
support the four-factor solution and the purpose of the current study is to determine 
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potential underlying dimensions (as opposed to item reduction), the four-factor solution 
was retained to best explain the structure. The first factor consisted of the reward and 
punishment reversal learning tasks and the delayed discounting task. The second factor 
included block A and block B of the persistence task. The third factor consisted of the 
ambiguity and risk tolerance tasks. The fourth factor consisted of the winning probability 
prediction question, and the proposer and responder roles of the ultimatum game.   
To determine which of these factors, if any, were associated with depression, we 
ran a logistic regression model. The predictors as a set reliably distinguished depressed 
individuals from controls (χ2 = 18.89, p < .001 with df = 4). However, the Wald criterion 
demonstrated that only the first factor was a significant predictor (p = .001), though the 
third and fourth factors approached significance (Table 9).  
Self-Report Measures. An exploratory factor analysis using principal axis 
factoring with promax rotations was conducted, with two factors explaining 63.62% of 
the variance (Table 10). Both parallel analysis (Table 11) and the scree plot (Figure 7) 
supported the two-factor structure. The first factor comprised of all the negative affect 
related questionnaires including the self-esteem, behavioral inhibition, Snaith Hamilton 
and cognitive-avoidance subcomponents. The underlying factor seemed to explain overall 
depression. The second factor consisted of positive components including the three 
activation BAS components in the BIS/BAS measure.  
To determine which of these factors, if any, were associated with depression, we 
ran a logistic regression model. The predictors as a set reliably distinguished depressed 
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individuals from controls (χ2 = 115.08, p < .0001 with df = 2). The Wald criterion 
demonstrated that only the first factor (negative affect) was a significant predictor (p < 
.0001) (Table 12).  
Logistic Regression   
We conducted logistic regressions using decision performance and self-reports to 
determine out of sample prediction accuracy, and to isolate specific tasks or self-reports 
that explain unique variance in depression.  
A logistic regression analysis was conducted using all of the decision tasks as 
predictors, and was statistically significant (χ2 = 26.81, p < .003 with df = 10). 
Nagelkerke’s R2 of .26 indicated a small relationship between prediction and grouping. 
The Wald criterion demonstrated that proportion of rich choices in the punishment 
learning task made a significant contribution to prediction (p = .02), while the minimum 
acceptance amount in the ultimatum game (p = .053) and winning probability  (p = .076) 
trended towards significance (Table 13).  
Using a step-down procedure, we created a reduced model with only significant 
predictors (Table 14). The reduced model contained only three predictors (punishment 
learning, responder in the ultimatum game, winning probability judgment). The 
predictors as a set reliably distinguished depressed individuals from controls (χ2 = 20.97, 
p < .001 with df = 3). We used this model to determine out-of-sample prediction accuracy 
for the decision tasks. Prediction accuracy was 62%, which is significantly beyond 
chance levels (Z = 2.37, p = .02, 95% CI .52 - .70).  
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A logistic regression analysis was conducted using the self-report measures as 
predictors. The predictors as a set reliably distinguished depressed individuals from 
controls (χ2 = 131.04, p < .0001 with df = 10). Nagelkerke’s R2 of .86 indicated a strong 
relationship between prediction and grouping. The Wald criterion demonstrated the 
Rosenberg Self Esteem (p = .08), the Snaith Hamilton (p = .08) and the BIS (p = .09) 
trended towards significance (Table 15).  
Using a step-down procedure, we created a reduced model with only significant 
predictors (Table 16). The reduced model contained only three predictors (Snaith-
Hamilton, self-esteem and BIS). The predictors as a set reliably distinguished depressed 
individuals from controls (χ2 = 122.65, p < .000 with df = 3). Nagelkerke’s R2 of .83 
indicated a strong relationship between prediction and grouping. We used this model to 
determine out-of-sample prediction accuracy for self-reports. Prediction accuracy was 
92%, which is significantly beyond chance levels (Z = 9.34, p < .0001, 95% CI .86 - .95).  
Discussion 
The first question this study addressed was how depressed individuals differ from 
healthy controls in value-based decision-making. Depressed individuals were less 
successful at learning from punishments and from rewards, offered more money as a 
proposer and accepted less money as a responder in the ultimatum game, believed they 
had a lower probability of receiving money from the experiment, had greater ambiguity 
tolerance, and were less persistent in waiting for delayed rewards (when persistence was 
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the best strategy). Depressed individuals did not differ from healthy controls in their 
degree of delay discounting or risk tolerance.  
A factor analysis of performance across all of these tasks identified four 
dimensions. The first factor called myopic decision making was comprised of the 
learning tasks and delay discounting. These tasks may jointly identify a tendency to make 
decisions based on the immediate context, rather than taking prior experience or future 
outcomes into consideration. The second and third factors were straightforward, and were 
comprised of the persistence tasks and tasks measuring tolerance of uncertainty 
respectively. The fourth factor, bias, was comprised of the prediction question and the 
ultimatum game. The prediction question and the proposer role of the ultimatum game 
may jointly identify a tendency towards pessimistic beliefs (e.g., “I won’t win,” “That 
offer wouldn’t be accepted.”) 
The second question this study addressed was what the biggest differences in 
value-based decision-making are between depressed and non-depressed individuals. The 
three tasks that showed the most reliable differences were punishment learning, 
predicting the likelihood of a positive event, and behavior as a responder in the ultimatum 
game. These three tasks were also the most significant predictors of depression.  The 
three tasks accounted for distinct variance in predicting depression and loaded onto two 
separate dimensions in the decision performance factor analysis.    
The third question this study addressed was how accurately depressed individuals 
could be categorized on the basis of decision performance alone. A logistic regression 
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model with the three most predictive tasks as regressors had an out-of-sample correct 
prediction accuracy of 62%. Although not dramatic, this degree of accuracy was 
significantly beyond chance. A logistic regression model using the self-report measures, 
on the other hand, showed an extremely high predictive accuracy of 92%. These results 
clearly demonstrate that value-based decision tasks are still a long way from the 
predictive accuracy of self-reports. However, we hasten to add two caveats. First, 
depression is determined by structured clinical interviews in which patients provide 
subjective reports of their symptoms. Thus it is not surprising that the written self-reports 
have such a high predictive accuracy, given the similarity of the constructs of the shared 
variance in method. Second, the goal of examining the predictive accuracy of decision 
performance is not to develop a diagnostic test for depression according to current 
diagnostic criteria, but rather to identify theoretically driven behavioral measures that 
may capture some of the heterogeneous differences between depressed and healthy 
individuals. Considering these two caveats, the significant predictive accuracy of value-
based decision-making tasks we observed shows promise for future research in this area.  
Interestingly, the three tasks that our results highlight as being most sensitive to 
depression – punishment learning tasks, probability judgment and the ultimatum game – 
have all been associated with depression previously. Punishment learning was the most 
predictive task. There is now a large body of research showing that reinforcement 
learning is impaired in mood disorders (Dombrovski et al., 2010; McGirr, Dombrovski, 
Butters, Clark, & Szanto, 2012; D. Pizzagalli et al., 2009; D. A. Pizzagalli, Iosifescu, 
Hallett, Ratner, & Fava, 2008). For example, in one study participants make a difficult 
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perceptual categorization over the course of several trials, and the probability of reward 
delivery is three times higher following one response versus the other. In healthy 
volunteers, this manipulation reliably induces a bias toward the “rich” (more frequently 
rewarded) response and away from the “poor” response (D. A. Pizzagalli et al., 2008). 
Adults with MDD develop weaker response biases. Similar results have been obtained 
with other reinforcement learning paradigms. Our findings suggest that reinforcement 
learning is the domain in which depressed individuals differ the most from controls. 
Given the well-established role of the dopamine system in reinforcement learning, this 
reinforces the critical role that changes in dopaminergic neural circuits, including targets 
in the ventromedial frontal lobe and ventral striatum, may play in depression (Mayberg, 
1994; Tye et al., 2012).  
The depressed group also differed reliably from healthy controls on the prediction 
questionnaire, estimating a significantly lower likelihood of winning additional payment. 
As the depressed group predicted a 50% probability, when the true probability was much 
higher, they exhibited a clear pessimistic bias. This is in alignment with previous research 
indicating that depressed individuals were more pessimistic in their predictions of the 
likelihood of future outcomes than non-depressed individuals, given identical information 
with which to make their forecasts  (Alloy & Ahrens, 1987). The literature on optimism 
bias and depressive realism supports a difference between depressed individuals and 
controls that goes in the same direction. That this difference was apparent using only one 
question in the current study suggests it is reliable. Furthermore, brain activity in the 
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rostral anterior cingulate cortex is associated with the trait optimism while irregularities 
in this area are related to depression  (Sharot, Riccardi, Raio, & Phelps, 2007).  
Depressed individuals were also more likely to accept unfair proposals in the 
ultimatum game. A previous study also found that depressed individuals were more likely 
to accept unfair proposals  (Harlé, Allen, & Sanfey, 2010). Another study did not see this 
effect, but did find that MDD patients offered significantly more as proposers  (Destoop, 
Schrijvers, De Grave, Sabbe, & De Bruijn, 2012), as we find here. Depression is 
accompanied by clear deficits in social interaction, and a social decision making task like 
the ultimatum game may prove a useful tool in dissecting these deficits. 
Depressed individuals were significantly different from controls in two other 
decision tasks, although the effects in these cases were smaller. Contrary to the avoidance 
behavior demonstrated by depressed individuals in daily life activities, they were more 
tolerant of ambiguity than controls. One possible explanation is that depressed 
individuals saw both gambles in this task as highly uncertain or as having low subjective 
probability. That is, depressed individuals may distinguish less between risk and 
ambiguity.  As this is the first investigation of ambiguity aversion in depression to our 
knowledge, further replication is warranted. Future studies should also examine the 
generalizability of this finding beyond monetary gambles.  
Unlike previous suggestions  (Lempert & Pizzagalli, 2010), we did not find 
differences between depressed and non-depressed individuals in delay discounting. In the 
persistence task, however, depressed individuals were willing to wait significantly less 
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time for the delayed reward under conditions where persistence is the optimal strategy 
(Block A). No differences were observed when persistence was not the optimal strategy 
(Block B). Given the known role of serotonin signaling in persistence, further 
investigation of this effect is merited. 
The results need to be interpreted in light of a couple of limitations. Though many 
patients were referred from depression clinics, we do not have inter-rater reliability for 
the depression diagnosis. We did not look at treatment and drug effects. Although we did 
not screen out individuals comorbid with bipolar, substance abuse and/or psychotic 
symptoms, we did not take other co-morbidity issues into account. Though we matched 
the groups on IQ, we did not include IQ in the analyses. Working memory, another 
potential confound, was also not taken into account. There may be other, unmeasured, 
confounds that differ between the two groups.  
Another limitation of the study is both the clinical and control groups were 
combined in the sample for the factor analysis, as the sample size would have been too 
small for separate analyses. Because of the potential lack of homogeneity in the 
combined sample, the interpretation of these results should be treated with caution.  
Limitations withstanding, we see two important directions in which this work 
could be extended. First, the current study focused on distinguishing depressed from 
healthy individuals. An equally important task is to distinguish different mental illnesses 
from each other and/or discover their commonalities. We know very little about whether 
and in what way decision-making measures may prove useful for this purpose. Second, 
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the decision measures that were most predictive in the current study may prove even 
more so with further refinement. There are numerous ways depressed individuals may 
perform poorly in punishment learning, and the other two measures were essentially 
single questions. Beyond refining the behavioral measures, these three tasks are also 
associated with distinct neural activity, and therefore may point towards brain measures 
that may prove even more sensitive and specific. Overall further investigation of decision 
making in clinically depressed individuals is warranted to better understanding the nature 
of clinical depression. 
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CHAPTER 3: REWARD? WHAT REWARD? PROBABILISTIC REVERSAL 
LEARNING IN MAJOR DEPRESSIVE DISORDER 
 
Abstract 
Evidence suggests that depression is associated with impaired reward and 
punishment processing but very little research has investigated the specific performance 
deficits driving poor outcomes. We analyzed reinforcement-based decision-making 
behavior of individuals diagnosed with depression at three levels: overt performance in 
terms of proportion of richer choices, specific types of choices driving performance and, 
finally, quantitatively modeling choice behavior based on computational reinforcement 
learning (RL) models. 
Methods: Sixty-four clinically depressed and 64 healthy controls participated in a 
reward and punishment-based RL probabilistic task. Participants were compensated for 
their participation.  
Results: Depressed individuals made significantly poorer choices on both the 
reward (d = .37) and the punishment (d = .58) reversal learning task. Depressed 
participants made significantly less win-stay choices, i.e., making the same choice, given 
the choice led to a reward or no punishment in the previous trial (d = 5.1 and 3.92 for 
punishment and reward task respectively). Choice behavior in depressed individuals was 
best fit by model free RL while model based learning best described choice behavior of 
healthy controls. Additionally, depressed individuals robustly showed a lower stimulus-
learning rate controlling for action learning rate, perseveration, and choice bias.  
 
60 
 
Conclusion: The results suggest that depression is characterized by 
hyposensitivity to reward. The RL models suggest impaired performance was due to both 
cognitive deficits as well as reduced reward responsiveness in depressed individuals. The 
results are promising for the emerging field of computational psychiatry.  
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Reward? What Reward? Probabilistic Reversal Learning in Major Depressive Disorder 
 
 Depression is associated with varied symptoms ranging from mood changes to 
cognitive impairment (Smith, Morris, Friston, Cowen, & Dolan, 1999). Some of these 
symptoms may be driven at least in part by abnormal responses to affective stimuli, such 
as rewards and punishments (Eshel & Roiser, 2010). In the previous chapter (Mukherjee, 
unpublished) we saw that depressed individuals perform significantly differently from 
healthy controls on several decision-making tasks, but the most robust differences were 
in learning from rewards and punishments. Prior research corroborates our findings and 
shows that depressed individuals exhibit deficits in reward learning/reward bias tasks. 
Further, these deficits have been associated with symptoms of depression such as 
deriving low positive affect from pleasant events and high negative affect from 
unpleasant events (Brown, Chorpita, & Barlow, 1998).  
Although there is strong evidence that depressed individuals are impaired at 
reward and punishment learning, the underlying causes behind this impairment are less 
clear. A goal of the present study is to examine the reasons for impaired performance in 
probabilistic reversal learning for rewards and punishments. There are many possible 
causes for impairment on these tasks. Depressed individuals may exhibit a suboptimal 
learning rate, reacting too slowly or too quickly to rewards and punishments. In contrast 
to a general hypo- or hyper-responsiveness to rewards and punishments, depressed 
individuals may be able to learn the initial contingencies well, but then be unable to 
adjust when these contingences reverse. Alternatively, depressed individuals may be less 
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able to take advantage of the structure of the task – that when one stimulus has a high 
probability of reward, the other has a low probability. This would suggest a cognitive 
deficit. There are several other possible explanations for poor performance that have little 
to do with learning reward or punishment contingencies per se. One possibility may be 
that depressed individuals perseverate more, i.e., once they pick an option they repeat that 
choice irrespective of feedback. Depressed individuals might also exhibit bias towards a 
particular stimulus irrespective of feedback. Finally, another possibility is that depressed 
individuals have stronger action-outcome associations, which are unhelpful and impede 
learning stimulus-outcome associations.  
Previous studies have linked depression with hyposensitivity to reward as well as 
hypersensitivity to punishment. The results from the previous chapter (Mukherjee, 
unpublished) show that impaired learning is significant in both the punishment and the 
reward-based task, with a stronger effect for the punishment task. However, in a study a 
probabilistic selection task used to examine hypersensitivity to punishment in Major 
Depressive Disorder (MDD) patients found no significant differences between MDD 
patients and healthy controls (Chase et al., 2010). Other studies have found a 
hyposensitivity to rewards. In a probabilistic reward task, participants were asked to 
identify whether the mouth length of a cartoon face was short or long, with participants 
receiving asymmetrical rewards depending on whether correct responses were provided 
(Pizzagalli, Jahn, & O’Shea, 2005). Non-depressed participants learned a response bias in 
which the highly reinforced choice was preferred, while nonclinical depressed 
participants and MDD patients showed low levels of response bias (Pizzagalli et al., 
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2005; Pizzagalli, Iosifescu, Hallett, Ratner, & Fava, 2008). The present study has two 
goals. First, does hypersensitivity to punishment, hyposensitivity to reward, or both, 
explain deficits in probabilistic reversal learning? The second goal is to determine 
whether learning is impaired for reward or punishment, or both, and to determine whether 
type of learning engaged by depressed individuals differs depending on reward or 
punishment feedback. 
To achieve these goals, the present study will investigate detailed aspects of 
reversal learning performance in both depressed and healthy control individuals and fit 
computational models to assess what aspects of performance differ in the two groups. 
Computational modeling is a more sophisticated method of understanding learning, 
which has been used to study healthy individuals and individuals with organic disorders 
such as Parkinson’s (Rutledge et al., 2009; Frank, Seeberger, & O'reilly, 2004; Daw, 
O'Doherty, Dayan, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006; Frank, Moustafa, Haughey, Curran, & 
Hutchison, 2007; O'Doherty et al., 2004), but has not yet been used to study learning 
behavior in depressed individuals.   
Methods 
Participants  
Between October 2012 and January 2014, 128 participants (64 diagnosed with 
current MDD and 64 healthy controls) were recruited for the study. MDD participants 
were recruited through flyers and information provided by research assistants for patients 
enrolling in treatment studies in the Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Health, and 
 
64 
 
flyers posted in the Counseling and Psychological Services at the University of 
Pennsylvania and the Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania (HUP). A small subset 
of these individuals (12) agreed to be taped during the diagnostic interview for reliability 
purposes. Diagnostic reliability was not ascertained for the purposes of the present study 
as more than 80% of the individuals who participated were being referred after being 
given a primary diagnosis of MDD for another clinical study at Penn. Healthy control 
participants were recruited from the staff and advanced students through flyers posted in 
the Department of Psychology, Law, and Psychiatry, the Graduate Student Office, and 
the HUP. Participants likely to meet study criteria based on an initial phone screen were 
invited for a diagnostic interview. MDD participants were enrolled if they met the 
following criteria (1) diagnostic criteria for current MDD, (2) no history of substance 
abuse/dependence in the past 6 months, (3) no history of bipolar disorder and/or 
psychotic episodes. Diagnostic criteria were determined based on the Structured Clinical 
Interview for Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth 
Edition (SCID/DSM-IV) (APA, 1994). Inclusion criteria for controls included absence of 
current or past psychiatric illness, as assessed by the SCID, and the absence of any 
psychotropic medications. 
All participants provided written consent after receiving a study description. The 
study was approved by the Institutional Review Board at the University of Pennsylvania. 
The clinical interview and study procedures were conducted by a master’s level trained 
clinical psychologist (DM). The data we report here from the reward and punishment 
reversal-learning tasks were collected as part of a larger research study investigating 
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value-based decision-making in individuals diagnosed with MDD. Participants were paid 
$15/hr. They received additional incentive based on their choices in one randomly 
selected decision task out of the eight administered. The sequence of administration of 
the various components of the study took place in the following order – administration of 
the structured clinical interview, performance on the eight decision-making tasks 
(including the reward and punishment probabilistic reversal learning tasks), performance 
on the similarities and matrix reasoning subtests of the Wechsler Abbreviated 
Intelligence Scale (WASI; Wechsler, 1999), and completion of self-report measures.  
Measures 
Clinical Measures. Inclusion and exclusion diagnostic criteria were based on the 
SCID. Depression severity was assessed with the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck 
et al., 1996). Current medication and psychotherapy treatment assessment was based on 
self-report.  
Cognitive Measure. The Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence - Second 
Edition (WASI–II) provides a brief, reliable measure of cognitive ability. For the purpose 
of efficiency, two subtests (matrix reasoning and similarities) of the WASI were 
administered to each subject to obtain a full scale IQ score.  
Reward Probabilistic Reversal Learning Task. In this task, subjects choose 
between two distinct fractal stimuli (Figure 8), which are positioned randomly at one of 
two locations (left and right of the central white dot) on screen. On each trial, participants 
respond by pressing a button on a keyboard to choose between the two fractals. Positive 
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feedback is provided if a fractal is reinforced with a reward (picture of a quarter); 
otherwise, neutral feedback is provided (a red dot). The fractals are probabilistically 
rewarded; with the richer fractal rewarded 70% of the time and the poorer fractal 
rewarded 30% of the time. Participants are not informed of the specific underlying 
reward structure of the task. However, they are informed that on any given trial, one 
fractal has a higher likelihood of delivering a reward and that this association reverses 
periodically throughout the task. All participants complete 4 trials as practice before 
proceeding to do a full run of 90 trials. The 90 trials are divided into three blocks of 30 
trials each. At the end of 30 trials a reversal takes place, i.e. the image which had the 
higher reward probability now has the lower reward probability and vice versa. Each 
reward has a monetary value of $0.25. At the end of the task, the screen displays the total 
number of quarters the participant won.  
Punishment Probabilistic Reversal Learning Task. This task is similar to the 
reward probabilistic reversal learning task except the goal for the participant is to try to 
avoid choosing the fractal leading to punishment (signified by red cross overlaying a 
quarter) (Figure 8). Participants are informed that at any given point, one fractal image 
leads to more losses than the other and that this will switch periodically. The participant 
starts the task with $22.50 and each time the participant chooses the fractal image 
followed by punishment feedback, $0.25 is deducted from the initial total amount 
($22.50). Like the reward task, subjects do a 4 trial practice, before proceeding to do a 
full run of 90 trials, with two reversals. On completion of the task, the screen displays the 
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total number of quarters the participant lost, and wins $22.50 minus the total number of 
lost quarters.  
Performance Analysis 
 Aspects of performance measured in both groups were, (1) average proportion of 
rich choices made, (2) proportion of win-stay choices and lose-shift choices, and (3) 
proportion of win-stay and lose-shift choices broken down by whether the fractals were 
presented on the same side or different sides in consecutive trials. Rich choices were 
choices of the fractal with the higher probability of reward (for the reward-learning task) 
or the higher probability of no punishment (for the punishment-learning task). A win-stay 
choice is when a participant repeats the same choice (chose the same fractal image) when 
making that choice in the previous trial led to a win (reward or no punishment). A lose-
shift choice is when the participant switches his/her choice (chose a different fractal 
image) when the choice in the previous trial led to no reward (in the reward-learning 
task) or to punishment (in the punishment-learning task). Win-stay and lose-shift choices 
were also analyzed separately depending on whether the fractals were presented on the 
same sides in consecutive trials or whether the fractals switched sides.  
Linear Regression Model 
In order to test whether the choice behavior of participants was consistent with 
reinforcement learning, we first fit a linear regression to choice data (Lau & Glimcher, 
2008). We assumed that influences of past rewards were linearly combined to determine 
choice on each trial, with choice probability computed using the softmax rule. We used 
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logistic regression to estimate weights for rewards received and choices made on 
previous trials. The goal of the regression was to estimate the probabilities of choosing 
the fractal 1 image, PF1(t), and the fractal 2 image, PF2(t), respectively. Since there are 
only two options, we assume symmetric weights for the two options, and the model for 
10 previous rewards and one previous choice reduces to the following: 
 (1) 
Here, the coefficients ai and b represent changes in the log odds of choosing fractal 1 and 
fractal 2 options with ai the weight for a reward received i trials ago, b is the weight for 
the last choice made. Positive weights indicate increases in the log odds of choice as a 
function of previous rewards (ai) or last choice. The log odds of the subject making a 
given choice on a specific trial is obtained by linearly combining outcomes (rewards), 
weighted by the coefficient extracted by the regression and a bias factor c. Behavior 
consistent with RL should demonstrate an exponential decline of the influence of past 
rewards. The linear regression model thus relaxes the constraint imposed by the 
reinforcement learning models that weights must decline exponentially, which enables us 
to examine the robustness of this assumption.  
Reinforcement Learning Models 
Finally, we fit different computational models to examine how these could 
account for aspects of performance that differed between the two groups. Computational 
models were fit with the function minimization tools in MATLAB.  
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Model Free RL 
 We first fit choice data from all subject groups with a standard reinforcement 
learning model (Sutton & Barto, 1998). The model uses the sequence of choices and 
outcomes to estimate the expected value of each option for every trial. The expected 
values are set to zero at the beginning of the experiment, and after each trial, the value of 
the chosen option (for example, for fractal 1 option at trial t) was updated 
according to the following rule: 
 (2) 
 (3) 
Here, is the stimulus reward prediction error (RPE), the difference between the 
experienced and the expected reward. represents the outcome received from the 
fractal 1 option on trial t with a value of 1 for a reward and 0 otherwise. The learning rate 
 determines how rapidly the estimate of expected value for the fractal image chosen is 
updated. If the learning rate is high, recent outcomes have a relatively greater influence 
on the expected value than less recent outcomes.  
This model also included other parameters that are not helpful for learning but 
that our analysis of the performance metrics indicated could potentially be influencing 
choice behavior. These added parameters included a term for choice perseveration, a term 
of bias towards one stimulus, and two terms (learning rate and noise) for action learning.  
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 Action learning is similar to the above model except that here the model uses the 
sequence of actions (left/right button presses rather than fractals chosen) and outcomes to 
estimate the expected value of each action for every trial. The expected values are set to 
zero at the beginning of the experiment, and after each trial, the value of the chosen 
action (for example, for the left hand option at trial t) was updated according to the 
following rule: 
 (4) 
 (5) 
Here, is the action reward prediction error (RPE), the difference between the 
experienced and the expected reward. is the outcome received from using the left 
hand on trial t with a value of 1 for a reward and 0 otherwise. The learning rate  
determines how rapidly the estimate of expected value is updated. If the learning rate is 
high, recent outcomes have a relatively greater influence on the expected value of than 
less recent outcomes.  
 Choice is theoretically a function of expected stimulus value. We can combine the 
stimulus and action based models into a six parameter model to reflect the influence of 
both types of learning parameters in a dual model. Given the expected values for both 
fractal options, the probability of choosing fractal 1 option is computed using the 
following softmax rule: 
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(6) 
Here, is the noise parameter for stimulus, is the noise parameter for action 
learning and are the values of fractal 1 and fractal 2 on trial t 
respectively, and is the values for choosing the left and the right hand 
respectively at trial t, and represent the choice of fractal 1 and 
fractal 2 on the presvious trial t – 1 respectively, with a value of 1 for the chosen 
option and 0 otherwise i.e. , and represent 
the bias towards fractal 1 and fractal 2 on the previous trial t – 1 respectively, 
with a value of 1 for the chosen option and 0 for the option not chosen.   
 
The dual RL model consisted of six parameters -  (stimulus based learning 
rate),  (action based learning rate), and (noise parameters), c (choice 
perseveration parameter), and d (bias parameter) and were estimated by maximum 
likelihood (Burnham & Anderson, 2002).  
Model based RL  
We also fit a second variation of the model that involved an update of both the chosen 
and unchosen options in the stimulus-based learning equation. This model approximates a 
model-based Bayesian learner, because it takes into account the structure of the task and 
the fact that the reward probabilities on the two options are anti-correlated. Stimulus 
values are updated using the following rule: 
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RPE                          (7) 
Chosen Value             (8) 
Unchosen Value       (9) 
 
The new value at trial for the currently chosen fractal is based on the sum of the 
observed prediction and the prediction error whereas the value for the 
unchosen option is based on a fictitious prediction error that takes 
the counterfactual outcome for the current trial into account. In this model is the 
learning rate, i.e., the influence of both prediction errors on the value update. The 
inclusion of an update rule for the unchosen option captures an important feature of the 
task structure, namely that the choice values are anti-correlated. This update rule 
incorporates the knowledge the participants have that when the action they are choosing 
increases or decreases in value, the value of the option they are not choosing does the 
opposite.  
 
Model Comparison 
To compare the RL models, we penalized model fits for complexity using the 
Bayesian information criterion (BIC; Schwarz, 1978). We computed BIC using the 
following equation: 
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 (10) 
Here, L is the maximum log likelihood for the estimated model given the data, k is the 
number of free parameters in the model, and n is the number of trials. Models with lower 
BIC are preferred.  
Statistical Analysis 
 Statistical analyses were performed using SPSS 21.0 and MATLAB 8.2. All tests 
were two-sided. We first compared groups on demographic and clinical characteristics 
using independent t-tests, one-way ANOVA and chi-square tests (Table 17). Performance 
metrics were compared between the two groups or within groups using independent t-
tests. 
Results 
Demographic Characteristics  
Groups did not differ with respect to gender, education, ethnicity, or age (p values 
above .3, Table 17). The groups did not differ in cognitive ability (p = .35). Participants 
in the MDD sample were moderately to severely depressed, with a significantly higher 
average BDI–II mean score of 30.03 (SD = 10.46) than control subjects was (M = 2.9, 
SD = 4.32, p < .001). Within the MDD group, 41% and 52% were on current medication 
or in treatment for depression, respectively.  
Behavioral Performance Results 
BIC 2log logL k n  
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Depressed individuals performed significantly poorer on both reward and 
punishment reversal learning. In the reward reversal learning task depressed participants 
(M = 59.59%, SD = 9.84) made significantly fewer rich choices than the controls (M = 
63.21%, SD = 10.80, p = .05). This was true for the punishment task also. In the 
punishment reversal-learning task, the depressed participants (M = 58.49%, SD = 9.93) 
made significantly fewer rich choices than the controls (M = 64.56%, SD = 10.81, p = 
.001, Figure 9).  
These deficits appear during initial learning and continue throughout the task, a 
pattern inconsistent with a specific inability to reverse learned contingencies. In the 
reward task, we see controls perform better than the depressed group across all three 
blocks, with significant differences from trials 30 through 57 and 72 through 77 (p values 
< .04, Figure 9). For the punishment-learning task, we see a similar pattern (Figure 9). 
The depressed group chose significantly less rich choices from the beginning, with 
significant differences from trials 12 through 23, 32 through 57 and finally 74 through 85 
(p values < .01). 
We next examined whether behavior in the two groups was consistent with 
reinforcement learning by measuring a participant’s win-stay and lose-shift choices. 
Specifically, behavior consistent with RL would evidence a high proportion of win-stay 
choices. In the reward learning task, the average proportion of win-stay choices for both 
groups was above 50%, but was significantly less for the depressed group (M = .74, S.E 
= .03) than the control group (M = .84, S.E = .02, p = .03) (Figure 10). No significant 
differences were observed for lose-stay choices with both groups shifting approximately 
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50% of the time after experiencing no reward in the preceding trial. A similar pattern was 
observed in the punishment learning task. The average proportion of win-stay choices 
was greater than 50% in both groups, but significantly less in the depressed group (M = 
.71, S.E = .03) compared to the control group (M = .83, S.E = .02, p < .001) (Figure 10). 
Again, there were no significant differences for the lose-shift proportions. The high 
proportion of win-stay choices in both groups in both tasks is consistent with 
reinforcement learning. However, the controls were more responsive to positive feedback 
in both tasks, suggesting the depressed group may be less sensitive to positive outcomes.  
Looking at win-stay versus lose-shift choices according to whether the specific 
motor response repeated or not (fractals were on the same side vs. different side across 
trials) revealed a potential influence of action learning on task performance. In the reward 
learning task, a within group comparison demonstrated both depressed and control 
individuals were significantly more likely to win-stay and lose-shift when the specific 
motor action repeated across trials (p’s <.05). The punishment task results showed a 
similar significant pattern (p’s <.05) for win stay and lose shift action association (Figure 
10). In short, both groups engaged in action outcome learning.  
 To more rigorously check whether choice behavior was consistent with 
reinforcement learning, we fit trial-by-trial choice data using a linear regression model 
(Figure 11). Reinforcement learning models assume the influence of rewards from 
previous trials decays in an exponential manner determined by the learning rate (α). The 
linear regression fits show behavior was consistent with reinforcement learning in both 
tasks in both groups. The first two parameters were above zero for both groups in both 
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tasks, and higher weight was assigned to the reward received in the preceding trial 
compared to rewards received two trials back (p’s < .0001). The fits also suggest that the 
control group learns at a faster rate, as a higher weight was assigned to the most recent 
trial in the control group than in the depressed group (reward task, t = 9.31, p < .0001; 
punishment task, t = 9.67, p < .0001). 
 We next analyzed whether computational models could capture these aspects of 
performance, including the difference between the two groups. We first compared the 
model-free versus model-based reinforcement learning algorithms.  Model-free learning 
only updates the value of the chosen option, while model based learning implies both 
chosen and unchosen values are updated. The model-based algorithm thus takes into 
account the structure of the task, that reward probabilities on the two fractals are 
anticorrelated. Given the observed effects of repeating the motor action on win-stay and 
lose shift choices in both groups, we also included a (model-free) action learning 
component in the model, as well as terms for choice persistence and bias towards one of 
the fractals. 
Two major differences were detected between the groups. First, for both the 
reward and punishment learning tasks, model-based reinforcement learning fit the choice 
data for the control group better than model-free reinforcement learning, while the 
reverse was true in depressed individuals (Table 18). Second, irrespective of model-based 
versus model-free, the one component of the model that significantly differed across 
groups was the learning rate (Table 19). Models that assumed that depressed and control 
subjects had different learning rates consistently fit the choice data better, while this was 
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not the case for action learning, persistence, or bias parameters. In the reward task, the 
best fit learning rate for controls is .73 while for depressed individuals it was .41; for the 
punishment task, the learning rates were .71 and .37 for controls and depressed 
respectively. Thus, for both tasks depressed individuals demonstrate a lower learning rate 
than controls.  
Discussion 
 In this study we show why depressed individuals learn from rewards and 
punishments poorer than controls. Our analyses of performance and computational 
modeling of behavior revealed two interesting differences. First, depressed individuals 
are more likely to engage in model-free reinforcement learning while controls are more 
likely to use the structure of the task and engage in model-based reinforcement learning. 
Second, regardless of whether learning is model-free or model-based, depressed 
individuals have a lower learning rate than controls. These two differences held 
irrespective of whether the task involved reward learning or punishment learning.  
Our detailed analyses of performance help answer an important question - are 
depressed individuals hyposensitive to reward, hypersensitive to punishment, or both? 
Hyposensitivity to reward would fit nicely with one of the primary symptoms of 
depression, anhedonia, which is the inability to experience pleasure from experiences 
previously enjoyed. Hypersensitivity to punishment could explain the avoidance 
behaviors also characteristic of depression. Just looking at overall performance on reward 
and punishment learning, one might be tempted to interpret the larger deficit in 
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punishment learning as evidence for hypersensitivity to punishment. However, a more 
detailed look shows convincingly that depressed individuals are less sensitive to positive 
feedback in these probabilistic reversal learning tasks, and that this is true regardless of 
whether the task involves learning from rewards or punishments. This shows that a 
hyposensitivity to reward (including “no punishment” trials in the punishment task) is 
driving the difference in task outcome, not hypersensitivity to punishment. This 
information is also important in terms of understanding depression. Depressed 
individuals may need more help in recognizing and integrating reward and positive 
information as opposed to decreasing the impact of punishment and negative information. 
Why were depressed individuals worse in the punishment task? This could 
potentially be due to the weak positive feedback signal in the task, which is essentially 
“no punishment.” According to this explanation, depressed individuals are hyposensitive 
to positive feedback, and perform worse when that positive feedback is the lack of 
punishment than when that positive feedback is the receipt of a reward.  
The computational modeling fits show that depressed individuals were more 
likely to engage in model-free learning strategies, while controls were more likely to 
engage in model-based learning strategies. Model-based learning takes into account the 
structure of the task (specifically, that reward probabilities on the two fractals are 
anticorrelated). Model-based learning may be associated with more controlled and goal-
directed behavior while model-free learning may be associated with more habitual and 
automatic behavior. Previous studies have shown that model-based learning entails a 
higher cognitive load, which can be disrupted under the influence of stress. Studies have 
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found that the stress response attenuates the contribution of model-based but not model-
free learning to choice (Otto, Raio, Chiang, Phelps, & Daw, 2013; Otto, Gershman, 
Markman, & Daw, 2013). Moreover, stress-induced behavioral changes were modulated 
by individual working memory (WM) capacity, such that low-WM-capacity individuals 
were more susceptible to detrimental stress effects than high-WM-capacity individuals. 
An appealing interpretation of our findings, then, is that the psychological stress of 
depression may interfere with goal-directed or model-based learning, leading depressed 
individuals to depend on suboptimal model-free learning strategies.  
 The second difference we observed in our computational model fits was that 
depressed individuals exhibited a lower learning rate than controls in both the reward and 
punishment learning tasks. This finding is also supported by the lower percentage of win-
stay choices in the depressed group and the linear regression fits. This effect is consistent 
with the literature suggesting reduced reward responsiveness in depressed individuals. 
Using probabilistic reinforcement learning tasks, studies have found MDD individuals, 
compared to controls, show significantly reduced reward responsiveness (Eshel & Roiser, 
2010; Pizzagalli et al., 2005; Pizzagalli et al., 2008). In one study, trial-by-trial 
probability analyses revealed that MDD subjects were impaired at integrating 
reinforcement history over time and developed a weaker response bias toward the 
stimulus with a higher reward probability (Pizzagalli et al., 2008).  
Finally, although not measured directly in the current study, the current results 
suggest neurobiological implications. Reinforcement learning has been associated with 
dopaminergic signals and the prefrontal cortical and striatal targets of those signals. 
 
80 
 
Studies support attenuated striatal function in depressive pathology across multiple 
cognitive tasks, from higher-order planning to gambling (Eshel & Roiser, 2010; Price & 
Drevets, 2009). Interestingly, one study found impaired reward (but not punishment) 
reversal behavior in depression alongside attenuated ventral striatal response to 
unexpected reward (Robinson, Cools, Carlisi, Sahakian, & Drevets, 2012). Another study 
found that reduced ventral striatal responsiveness to unexpected rewards predicted the 
severity of depression across both unipolar and bipolar depressed groups (Satterthwaite et 
al., unpublished). Will specific computational deficits in reinforcement learning tasks 
capture this aspect of reward responsiveness or anhedonia across disorders, and if so, is 
this linked to common ventral striatal dysfunction? A key priority for future research 
should be to more closely link these neural and behavioral effects of depression, as well 
as to explore these effects across a wider range of disorders where blunted reward 
responsiveness is a key component, including across mood disorders (unipolar and 
bipolar depression) and psychotic disorders that share the common symptom of 
anhedonia (Gold, Waltz, Prentice, Morris, & Heerey, 2008; Waltz, Frank, Robinson, & 
Gold, 2007).  
The results need to be interpreted in light of a couple of limitations. Though many 
patients were referred from depression clinics, we do not have inter-rater reliability for 
the depression diagnosis. We did not look at treatment and drug effects. Although we did 
not screen out individuals comorbid with bipolar, substance abuse and/or psychotic 
symptoms, we did not take other co-morbidity issues into account. Though we matched 
the groups on IQ, we did not include IQ in the analyses. Working memory, another 
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potential confound, was also not measured in the present study. There may be other, 
unmeasured, confounds that differ between the two groups.  
In addition, the current research does not address the causal relationship between 
depression and reward learning. The current study establishes an association, but whether 
impaired reward learning is a pre-existing risk factor for depression or an effect of 
depression remains unanswered. Future research could address this question with 
longitudinal studies or treatment studies. Longitudinal studies would track reward 
learning performance and onset of depression over a period of time to determine whether 
the onset of depressive symptoms leads to reward learning impairment or whether 
impaired reward learning prefaces depressive symptoms. An unselected sample would be 
necessary to carry out this study. Treatment studies would measure reward learning 
impairment pre and post treatment of depression. An improvement in reward learning 
performance for individuals with depressive symptoms in remission would imply 
depression causes reward learning impairment as opposed to vice versa (Pizzagelli et al., 
2013). 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The current research aimed to understand the scope of decision making in 
psychopathology. Study 1 answered the basic question of whether or not decision-making 
is impaired in mental illness populations. Two meta-analyses were conducted of studies 
that used the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) to assess value-based decision-making in mental 
illness populations. In the first meta-analysis we compared IGT performance in healthy 
populations and populations with mental illness. In the second meta-analysis we 
examined raw IGT performance scores as a function of type of mental illness. The first 
meta-analysis demonstrated that individuals with mental illness performed significantly 
worse than healthy control individuals. The second meta-analysis demonstrated no 
performance differences based on disorder type. These findings suggest that value-based 
decision-making is a promising target for transdiagnostic analyses of processes that go 
awry in mental illness but is not sensitive enough to differentiate within disorders.  
Study 2 aimed to address two objectives based on the performance of a clinical 
sample of MDD patients on a number of value-based decision-making tasks.  First, we 
wanted to identify potential dimensions of decision making worth further investigation, 
and, second, to assess whether decision-making could serve as a potential predictive 
diagnostic tool. Depressed individuals’ decision-making performance was found to be 
significantly different across a range of decision tasks. Of the decision tasks, punishment 
learning and a pessimism bias were significant predictors of depression. Decision tasks 
significantly predict depression but are far outperformed by self-report measures as 
predictive diagnostic tools. Overall results suggest decision tasks could function as 
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identifying processes gone awry rather than diagnostic prediction of psychopathology. 
Thus decision-making may serve as identifying behavioral signatures of psychopathology 
such as learning and bias in depressed individuals.  
Based on the results of study 2 and literature supporting impaired reinforcement 
learning in clinical depression, study 3 examined the underlying causes of impaired 
reinforcement-based learning in depressed patients using computational reinforcement 
learning models. From a performance perspective, the results suggest that depression is 
characterized by a hyposensitivity to reward and not hypersensitivity to punishment. The 
computational model analyses led to two important findings. First, model free 
reinforcement learning best accounted for learning in depressed individuals while model-
based learning best explained choice behavior of control individuals. Second, depressed 
individuals had a significantly lower learning rate than controls. These results are 
promising for the emerging field of computational psychiatry and demonstrate the 
potential and scope of using decision-making to understand and explain psychopathology 
from a behavioral perspective.  
 The above series of studies extends the current state-of-art in a number of ways. 
Study 1 quantitatively reviewed and demonstrated that decision-making is indeed 
impaired in mental illness populations. Interestingly enough, no differences were detected 
within the mental illness populations. This was surprising given the severity and range of 
population from unipolar depression to psychotic disorders and personality disorders. 
However, the mental illness group did perform better than organic lesion populations as 
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expected. Overall from an NIMH process perspective, decision-making may be 
considered a potential candidate worth further investigation within disorders.  
The lack of within mental illness group differences was addressed somewhat in 
study 2 by investigating a number of value based decision-making tasks within a specific 
disorder. Our goal was to determine whether decision-making could be treated as one 
process or whether there were dimensions within the process that would further delineate 
areas of potential impairment in decision-making for a specific population, in this case 
clinical depression. We found depressed individuals performed significantly differently 
across a range of decision-making tasks but certain tasks resulted in more robust 
differences than others. Reinforcement learning, social decision-making and bias were 
the strongest contenders. Not surprisingly there is research evidence supporting these 
findings specifically in depressed individuals.  
Investigating the underlying causes of reinforcement learning impairment lead to 
study 3. Studies have demonstrated that possible reasons for impairment could be 
cognitive deficits or hyper responsivity to punishment or hypo responsivity to reward. 
Through computational reinforcement modeling we found model free reinforcement 
learning explained the depressed group choices while model-based reinforcement 
learning best explained the control group choices. This suggests that the stress of 
depression could potentially lead to the inability to use more optimal model-based 
learning strategies. Running multiple models robustly showed the depressed individuals 
have a lower learning rate suggesting a hyposensitivity to reward.  
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These findings have implications for current trends in psychopathology research, 
which is moving away from a symptom-based approach to defining mental illness and 
moving towards a more process-based one, as prominently exemplified by the RDoC 
project. However, RDoC advocates for an even more radical approach to studying 
decision-making and psychopathology than that used in the current study. Instead of the 
outcome measure being clinically diagnosed depression, RDoC advocates for abandoning 
clinical categories.  What replaces these categories as outcome measures, whether 
biological correlates or specific behavioral measures or general measures of daily 
functioning, remains an open question.  
Leykin, Roberts and DeRubeis (2011) found that the failure to use adaptive 
decision-making strategies spontaneously is an important factor in determining the poor 
quality of the choices made by depressed individuals, and that prompting the use of such 
strategies improves decision-making considerably. One thing this result suggests is that 
some deficits in decision-making in depressed individuals might disappear when 
depressed individuals are sufficiently motivated or expend sufficient effort. Though lack 
of motivation would be hard to definitively rule out as an explanation for the current 
results, real incentives were used in the current study to equalize motivation as much as 
possible. Perhaps more importantly though, the results of Leykin and colleagues suggest 
that some decision making deficits in depressed individuals can be remediated, a prospect 
that should be explored in future research using the current decision making tasks.  
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 Overall the three studies highlighted a number of key points. First decision-
making is a process worth using as a tool for investigating mental illness. The feasibility 
of using decision-making as predictive classification tools, though, seems tentative at 
best. However, process-based research along with computational modeling could 
quantitatively explain behavior in a more objective and empirically way than self-reports 
have so far addressed. Future research investigating brain activation along with 
behavioral performance would further consolidate findings, as would treatment studies 
that follow decision-making performance in depressed individuals over the course of 
treatment. In conclusion decision-making is definitely a process worth investigating in 
mental illness populations as exemplified within a clinically depressed sample. 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1 
Characteristics of Studies Assessing Decision-making Performance in Clinical Population using the IGT  
Study name 
Clinical 
Type 
Disorder 
Type Diagnosis N 
Intelligence 
Assessment 
Intelligence 
Significant 
Substance 
Abuse 
Exclusion 
TBI 
Exclusion Hedge’s g 
Adida et al. 2008 Psych Mood  BiPolar 90 No NA No Yes -1.08 
Adida et al.2011 Psych Mood  BiPolar 195 Yes No Yes No -0.57 
Barry & Petry, 2008 Psych Sub Multiple 168 Yes No No Yes -0.49 
Bechara et al. 1994 Lesion Frontal Frontal 50 No NA No No -1.50 
Bechara et al. 2001 Lesion Frontal Frontal 45 Yes No Yes No -1.05 
Boeka & Lokken, 2006 Psych ED BN 40 Yes No Yes Yes -0.92 
Bolla et al. 2003 Psych Sub Cocaine 26 Yes No No Yes -0.32 
Bolla et al. 2005 Psych Sub Marijuana 22 Yes No No Yes -1.16 
Borges et al. 2011 Psych Anx OCD 118 Yes Yes No No -0.15 
Brogan et al. 2010 Psych ED BN and AN 59 No NA No No -0.94 
Cavedini et al. 2001 Psych PG  PG 60 Yes No No No -1.24 
Cavedini et al. 2002 Psych Anx OCD 68 No NA Yes Yes -0.95 
Cavedini et al. 2004 Psych ED AN 141 No NA Yes Yes -0.94 
Cavedini et al. 2010 Psych Anx OCD 66 No NA Yes Yes -1.44 
Choi et al. 2011 Psych Schiz Schiz 48 Yes No Yes Yes -0.06 
Clark et al. 2001 Psych MD BiPolar 45 Yes Yes Yes Yes -0.79 
Clark et al. 2003 Lesion Frontal Frontal 62 Yes No No No -1.09 
Da Rocha et al. 2011 Psych Anx OCD 214 Yes No Yes No -0.63 
Davis, 2011 Psych ED BED 191 No NA No No -0.24 
Dolan et al.2007* Psych Sub Multiple 68 No NA No No -3.15 
Dom, et al. 2007* Psych Sub Alcohol 91 Yes NR Yes Yes -2.28 
Easton et al. 2008 Psych Sub Alcohol 25 Yes Yes No No -1.53 
Evans et al. 2005 Psych Schiz Schiz 38 Yes NR No No 0.00 
Forbush et al. 2008 Psych PG  PG 59 Yes Yes No No 0.00 
Fridberg et al. 2010 Psych Sub Marijuana 32 Yes No No Yes -0.95 
Gonzalez-Blanch et al. 2008 Psych Schiz Schiz 91 Yes Yes Yes Yes -0.04 
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Grant et al. 2000 Psych Sub Multiple 54 Yes Yes No Yes -0.60 
Grisham et al. 2007 Psych Anx OCD 60 Yes Yes Yes No -0.15 
Guillaume et al. 2010 Psych ED BN and AN 170 Yes Yes No No 0.00 
Haaland & Landro 2007 Psych PD BPD 35 Yes Yes No Yes -1.49 
Hanson et al. 2008 Psych Sub Multiple 81 Yes No Yes Yes -0.54 
Jollant et al. 2005 Psych MD BiPolar 107 Yes No No Yes -0.29 
Kertzman et al. 2011 Psych PG  PG 108 No NA Yes No -0.65 
Kjome et al. 2010 Psych Sub Cocaine 86 Yes Yes No No -0.81 
Lane et al. 2010. Psych Sub Cocaine 33 No No No No -0.70 
Lawrence et al. 2006 Psych Anx OCD 79 Yes No Yes Yes -0.02 
Liao et al. 2009 Psych ED BN 77 Yes No No Yes -0.50 
Linnet et al 2011 Psych PG  PG 30 No NA Yes No 0.00 
Linnet et al. 2006 Psych PG  PG 100 No NA No No -0.34 
Loeber et al. 2009 Psych Sub Alcohol 84 Yes No No Yes -0.02 
MacPherson et al. 2009 Lesion Frontal Frontal 38 No NA No No -0.89 
Malloy Diniz et al. 2009 Psych MD BiPolar 89 Yes No No No -1.09 
Malloy-Diniz et al. 2011 Psych MD  BiPolar 189 Yes No No No -0.69 
Manes et al. 2002 Lesion Frontal Frontal 32 Yes No Yes No -1.28 
Martino et al. 2007 Psych Schiz Schiz 36 Yes No Yes Yes -0.60 
Martino et al. 2011 Psych MD BiPolar 119 Yes No Yes Yes -0.04 
Maurex et al. 2009 Psych PD BPD 78 No NA Yes No -0.37 
Mazas et al.2000 Psych PD ASPD 53 Yes No No No -1.10 
Miranda et al. 2009 Psych Sub Alcohol 60 Yes Yes No No -0.72 
Must et al. 2006 Psych MD MDD 50 No NA Yes No -1.35 
Nakamura et al. 2008 Psych Schiz Schiz 49 Yes Yes No No -0.76 
Nielen et al. 2002 Psych Anx OCD 53 Yes No No No 0.00 
Petry et al. 1998 Psych Sub Heroin 93 Yes No No No -0.38 
Pirastu et al. 2006 Psych Sub Opiate 69 Yes Yes No Yes -0.67 
Premkumar et al. 2008 Psych Schiz Schiz 100 Yes Yes Yes Yes -0.48 
Premkumar et al. 2010 Psych Schiz Schiz 45 Yes NR Yes Yes -0.47 
Raffard et al. 2011 Psych Schiz Schiz 128 Yes Yes No No -0.46 
Ritter et al. 2004 Psych Schiz Schiz 35 Yes No No No -0.74 
Rodríguez-Sánchez et al. 2005 Psych Schiz Schiz  
102 
Yes No Yes Yes  
-0.13 
Salgado et al. 2009 Psych Sub Alcohol 61 Yes No No Yes -0.94 
Sevy et al. 2007 Psych Schiz Schiz 47 Yes Yes No Yes -0.35 
Shirayama et al. 2010 Psych Schiz Schiz 37 Yes No Yes Yes -0.43 
Shurman et al. 2005 Psych Schiz Schiz 49 No NA Yes Yes -1.54 
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Note. Anx = Anxiety Disorders, AN = Anorexia Nervosa, BED = Binge Eating Disorder, BN = Bulimia Nervosa, ED = Eating Disorders, Lesion = Frontal Lobe Lesions or Ventro 
Medial Lesions, TBI = Traumatic Brain Injury, Sub = Substance Abuse and/or Dependence, Mood = Mood , PG = Pathological Gambling , Frontal = Frontal Lobe Lesion, PD = 
Personality Disorders, OCD = Obsessive Compulsive , BPD = Borderline Personality Disorder, ASPD = Anti Social Personality Disorder, NA = Not Applicable, NR = Not Reported 
MD= Mood Disorder, NR = Not Reported, Schiz = Schizophrenia, Multiple = Multiple Substance Use, MDD = Major Depressive Disorder, * = study excluded as an outlier.
Starcke et al. 2010 Psych Anx OCD 45 Yes No Yes Yes -1.07 
Vadhan et al. 2009 Psych Sub Cocaine 46 Yes Yes No No -1.09 
Van Toor et al. 2011 Psych Sub Multiple 62 No NA No No -0.94 
Wesley et al. 2011 Psych Sub Marijuana 32 Yes No No Yes -0.28 
Woicik et al. 2009 Psych Sub Cocaine 90 Yes No No Yes -0.08 
Xi et al. 2011 Lesion Frontal Frontal 46 Yes No Yes No -0.92 
Yip et al. 2009 Psych Schiz Schiz 63 Yes Yes Yes No -0.70 
Zhang et al. 2011 Psych Sub Heroin 39 Yes No No No -0.64 
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Table 2 
Characteristics of Studies Reporting Raw Mean IGT Performance in Clinical Populations 
Study Name  Disorder Type  Diagnosis N Mean IGT 
Performance  
SE 
Adida et al. 2008 Mood Bipolar 45 -1.50 3.94 
Alfonso et al. 2011 Substance Polysubstance 34 -6.72 2.49 
Alvarez-Moya et al. 2011 Gambling Pathological Gambling 88 -1.10 2.75 
Barry & Petry, 2008 Substance Polysubstance 131 2.30 1.76 
Bechara et al., 1994 Lesion  Frontal 6 -25.5 11.54 
Bechara et al., 1999 Lesion  Frontal 19 -20.67 6.76 
Bechara et al., 2000 Lesion  Frontal 10 -10.60 2.4 
Bolla et al. 2005 Substance Marijuana 11 8.47 4.37 
Bolla et al. 2003 Substance Cocaine 13 6.17 7.13 
Borges et al. 2011 Anxiety OCD 101 -3.71 2.08 
Clark et al., 2003 Lesion  Frontal  41 -1.07 3.26 
da Rocha et al. 2008 Anxiety OCD 49 -2.29 1.77 
da Rocha et al. 2011 Anxiety OCD 107 -4.96 1.24 
Davis et al., 2011 Eating Disorder Binge Eating Disorder 85 3.92 2.85 
Dolan et al. 2007 Substance Polysubstance 38 -2.10 1.26 
Dom et al. 2007 Substance Alcohol 38 2.40 0.83 
Gonzalez-Blanch et al. 
2008 
Psychotic 
Disorders 
Schizophrenia 70 -1.10 3.12 
Grant et al. 2000 Substance Polysubstance 30 10.20 4.70 
Grisham et al. 2007 Anxiety OCD 30 5.28 1.20 
Haaland & Landro 2007 Personality 
Disorders 
Borderline Personality 
Disorder 
20 -9.85 5.44 
Jollant et al. 2005 Mo d B p lar 25 9.20 5.12 
Kjome et al. 2010 Substance Cocaine 66 0.09 2.77 
Linnet et al. 2006 Gambling Pathological Gambling 61 -0.31 3.13 
Loeber et al. 2009 Substance Alcohol 48 0.90 1.16 
Malloy-Diniz et al. 2009 Mood Bipolar 36 -1.03 4.34 
Malloy-Diniz et al. 2011 Mood Bipolar 95 3.89 2.49 
Martino et al. 2007 Psychotic 
Disorders 
Schizophrenia 21 0.76 6.12 
Maurex et al 2009* Personality 
Disorders 
Borderline Personality 
Disorder 
48 18.90 4.03 
Mazas et al. 2000 Personality 
Disorders 
Anti Social Personality 
Disorder 
21 2.95 3.79 
McNeely et al. 2008 Mo d Major Depressive 
Disorder 
6 -3.10 1.22 
Miranda et al. 2009 Substance Alc hol 39 1.43 3.28 
Nakamura et al. 2008 Psychotic 
Disorders 
Schizophrenia 24 -3.83 5.54 
Pirastu et al. 2006 Substance Opioid 48 11.30 0.91 
Premkumar et al. 2008 Psychotic 
Disorders 
Schizophrenia 75 4.45 1.39 
Premkumar et al. 2010 Psychotic
Disorders 
Schizophrenia 30 2.80 2.16 
Ritter et al. 2004 Psychotic
Disorders 
Schizophrenia 20 -5.20 4.41 
Rodriguez-Sanchez et al. 
2005 
Psychotic
Disorders 
Schizophrenia 80 -1.63 3.09 
Salgado et al. 2009 Substance Alcohol 31 1.03 2.62 
Sevy et al. 2007 Psychotic 
Disorders 
Schizophrenia 27 -5.00 3.46 
Shirayama et al. 2010 Psychotic
Disorders 
Schizophrenia 19 -4.74 3.10 
Shurman et al. 2005 Psychotic
Disorders 
Schizophrenia 39 1.90 3.01 
Starcke et al. 2010 Anxiety OCD 23 -1.50 5.62 
van Toor et al. 2011 Substance Polysubstance 31 -3.46 4.73 
Wesley et al. 2011 Substance Marijuana 16 -3.38 2.18 
Yip et al. 2009 Psychotic 
Disorders 
Schizophrenia 42 5.20 4.17 
Note. IGT = Iowa Gambling Task, OCD = Obsessive Compulsive Disorder, SE = Standard Error of Mean IGT Scores, * = study 
excluded as an outlier.  
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Table 3 
Analyses of Moderation for the Between Group IGT studies 
 
Moderator  n Hedge’s g 95% CI Q (df) p 
Diagnosis 63   4.6 (6) 0.60 
Obsessive Compulsive Disorder 8 -0.54** -0.81 to -0.26   
Eating Disorder 6 -0.53** -0.84 to -0.21   
Mood Disorder 8 -0.70*** -0.98 to -0.44   
Pathological Gambling Disorder 5 -0.46 -0.82 to 0.10   
Personality Disorders 3 -0.90** -1.39 to -0.41   
Substance Dependence Disorder 19 -0.63*** -0.82 to -0.44   
Schizophrenia 14 -0.45*** -0.68 to -0.23   
Non-personality vs. Personality  63   1.79 (1) 0.18 
Non-personality disorder 60 -0.56*** -0.66 to -0.46  
 
  
Personality Disorder 3 -0.90*** -1.38 to -0.42   
Intelligence Assessment  63   8.58(1) 0.003** 
No 13 -0.86*** -1.07 to -0.65   
Yes 50 -0.51*** -0.61 to -0.40   
Intelligence Significant 50   2.4(1) 0.35 
Yes 18 -0.53*** -0.71 to -0.35   
No 
Not reported  
30 
2 
-0.52*** 
-0.15 
-0.66 to -0.39 
-0.64.to .33 
  
Substance Use Exclusion 63   1.08 (1) 0.58 
Yes  25 -0.58*** -0.74 to -0.41   
No 38 -0.60*** -0.74 to -0.47   
TBI/Neuropsychological Deficits 
Exclusion  
63   1.06 (1) 0.60 
Yes 32 -0.58*** -0.73 to -0.43   
No 31 -0.60*** -0.75 to -0.46   
Administration of IGT  63   1.40(1) 0.50 
Computer 51 -0.56*** -0.67 to -0.44   
Hand 12 -0.72*** -1.00 to -0.45   
Clinical Population  69   6.57 (1) 0.01** 
Lesion 6 -1.10*** -1.48 to -0.72   
Mental Illness 63 -0.58*** -0.67 to -0.48   
Note. n= number of studies, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p < 0.001 
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Table 4 
Analyses of Moderation for the Mean Performance IGT studies 
 
Moderator  n Effect Size  95% CI Q (df) p 
Disorder 40   2.32(6) 0.9 
Obsessive Compulsive Disorder  5 -1.35 -0.97 to -0.09   
Eating Disorder 1 3.92 -0.70 to 14.86   
Mood Disorder 5 0.9 -4.25 to 6.04   
Pathological Gambling  2 -0.72 -1.18 to 0.14   
Personality Disorders 2 -2.37 -11.54 to 6.80   
Substance Dependence 14 1.72 -1.2 to 4..64   
Schizophrenia 11 -0.28 -3.8 to 3.24   
Non-personality vs. Personality  40   0.38 (1) 0.54 
Non-personality Disorder 38 0.57 -1.19 to 2.32   
Personality Disorder 2 -2.33 -11.34 to 6.67   
Clinical Group  44   23.35 (1) <0.001*** 
Lesions 4 -14.12 -19.74 to -8.49   
Mental Illness 40 0.45 -1.35 to 2.26   
Note. n= number of studies, ***p < 0.001 
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Table 5 
Demographic Characteristics  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. ** = p < .001 
 
Depressed 
 
Control  
 
Significance 
 
N % N % p value 
Gender 
    
.3 
Male  27 57.8 33 51.6 
 Female  37 42.2 31 48.4 
 Ethnicity 
    
.76 
African American 34 53.1 33 51.6 
 Caucasian 24 37.5 23 35.9 
 Asian 4 6.2 7 10.9 
 Other 2 3.1 1 1.6 
 Education 
    
.31 
No High School Diploma 4 6.3 1 1.6 
 High School 
Diploma/Technical 
Training 
26 41.3 23 35.9 
 Associate’s Degree 10 15.9 12 18.8 
 Bachelor's Degree 12 19 16 25 
 Master's Degree 11 17.5 9 14.1 
 Doctoral Degree 0 0 3 4.7 
 On Medication 
    
<.001** 
Yes 29 45.3 0 0 
 No 33 51.6 63 98.4 
 Not Reported  1 1.6 1 1.6 
 In Therapy 
    
<.001** 
Yes 33 51.6 2 2.31 
 No 29 45.3 61 95.3 
 Not Reported  1 1.6 1 1.6 
 
      
 
M SD M SD p value 
Age 40.45 13.48 38.53 11.73 .4 
WASI  101.32 14.63 103.7 14.1 .35 
BDI 30.03 10.46 2.9 4.32 <.001** 
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Table 6   
Decision Task Performance in Depressed and Control Groups 
 
Decision Task Measure Depressed  Control p value 
  M SD N M SD N  
Risk Uncertainty         
Risk  Safe Choices (%) 56.69 23.07 63 59.12 22.34 64 .55 
Ambiguity  50-50 Choices (%) 59.30 26.14 64 68.06 22.64 64 .05* 
Learning Task         
Reward  Rich Choices (%) 59.59 9.84 61 63.21 10.80 63 .05* 
Punishment  Rich Choices (%) 41.51 9.93 61 35.44 10.81 63 .001** 
Ultimatum Game         
Proposer Minimum for Self ($) 5.39 0.79 64 5.78 1.27 64 .04* 
Responder Minimum for Self ($) 2.95 1.70 64 3.58 1.55 64 .03* 
Negative Bias         
Prediction  Probability in % 54.08 23.60 60 64.03 20.46 62 .01* 
Winnings Amount in $ 33.74 27.15 60 31.35 21.78 62 .60 
Temporal Tasks         
Delay Discounting  Now Choices (%) 67.16 24.89 64 71.06 23.36 64 .36 
Persistence          
 Block A (in secs) 13.77 2.82 64 14.74 2.06 63 .03 
 Block B (in secs) 12.83 3.54 63 12.87 3.98 64 .96 
Note. * p < .05 and ** p = .001 
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Table 7 
Factor loadings and communalities based on a principal axis factoring analysis with 
promax rotation for ten value-based decision-making tasks (N = 116) 
 
 Myopia Persistence Uncertainty Bias Communality 
Punishment: Rich Choice .71    .55 
Reward: Rich Choice .80    .63 
Now Choices - .36    .20 
BlockBmin1sec  .85   .32 
BlockAmin1sec  .60   .76 
Safe Choices   .48  .21 
50-50 Choices   .82  .70 
Winning Probability   .70 .48 
Propose for Self   .22 .10 
Accept for Self   -.21 .08 
Note. Factor loadings < .2 are suppressed.  
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Table 8 
Eigenvalues from Parallel Analysis of Decision Making Variables 
 
Factor Actual Eigenvalues  
for Current Data 
 
Average Eigenvalues  
for Random Data 
    
1 1.28 .76 
2 1.01 .53 
3 .54 .39 
4 .23 .28 
5 .13 .15 
6 -.06 .06 
7 -.12 -.03 
8 -.16 -.12 
9 -.30 -.19 
10 -.31 -.26 
Note. Factors above dotted line were retained in parallel analysis. 
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Table 9 
Summary of Logistic Regression Analysis for Factor Scores Predicting Depressed and 
Healthy Individuals  
 
 
B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp (B) 95%  C.I. for EXP(B) 
      
Lower Upper 
Myopia -.58 .256 5.063 .024 .562 0.00 6.904E+245 
Persistence .147 .281 .275 .600 1.159 0.00 1.819E+145 
Uncertainty .464 .269 2.980 .084 1.590 0.00 . 
Bias  .544 .317 2.944 .086 1.724 0.00 . 
Constant .147 .281 .275 .600 1.159 
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Table 10 
Factor loadings and communalities based on a principal axis factoring analysis with 
promax rotation for four self-reports (10 including sub-scales) measuring components of 
depression  (N = 125) 
 
 
Negative  Positive  Communalities 
CS .95 
 
.77 
BS .90 
 
.85 
BNS .94 
 
.87 
CNS .94 
 
.82 
Snaith-Hamilton -.64 
 
.66 
BIS .54 
 
.34 
Self-Esteem -.53 
 
.40 
Reward Responsiveness BAS 
 
.77 .55 
Fun Seeking BAS 
 
.83 .70 
Drive BAS 
 
.58 .43 
Note. Factor loadings < .4 are suppressed. BNS = Behavioral Non-Social avoidance, CS = 
Cognitive Social avoidance, BS = Behavioral Social avoidance, CNS = Cognitive Non-Social 
avoidance, BIS = Behavioral Inhibition Scale, BAS = Behavioral Approach Scale.  
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Table 11 
Eigenvalues from Parallel Analysis of Self-Report Variables 
 
Factor Actual Eigenvalues  
for Current Data 
Average Eigenvalues  
for Random Data 
1 8.86 .95 
2 1.20 .73 
3 .56 .60 
4 .29 .47 
5 .17 .37 
6 .14 .28 
7 .03 .21 
8 .01 .12 
9 -.02 .05 
10 -.03 -.02 
Note. Factors above dotted line were retained in parallel analysis. 
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Table 12 
Summary of Logistic Regression Analysis for Self Report Factor Scores Predicting 
Depression and Healthy Controls  
 
 
B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp (B) 95% C.I. for EXP(B) 
      
Lower Upper 
Negative  -4.23 .86 24.16 .00 .01 .003 .08 
Positive .56 .55 1.03 .31 1.75 .59 5.20 
Constant -1.10 .50 4.71 .03 .34 
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Table 13 
Summary of Logistic Regression Analysis for Decision Task Variables Predicting 
Depression and Healthy Controls  
 
 
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 95% C.I.for EXP (B) 
       
Lower Upper 
Safe Choices .00 .01 .13 1 .72 1.00 .98 1.02 
Now Choices .01 .01 .27 1 .60 1.01 .99 1.03 
50-50 Choice -.01 .01 1.10 1 .30 .99 .97 1.01 
Reward: Rich Choice .01 .03 .31 1 .58 1.01 .97 1.07 
Punishment: Rich Choice -.06 .03 5.66 1 .02* .94 .90 .99 
Minimum Accept .28 .14 3.73 1 .05* 1.32 1.00 1.74 
Minimum Propose .24 .22 1.12 1 .29 1.27 .82 1.97 
Winning Probability 
Prediction 
.02 .01 3.15 1 .08^ 1.02 1.00 1.04 
Block A (min1sec) .15 .13 1.39 1 .24 1.16 .91 1.50 
Block B (min1sec) -.06 .07 .88 1 .35 .94 .82 1.07 
Constant -3.32 3.27 1.03 1 .31 .04 
  Note. * = p ≤ .05, ^ p = .08 
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Table 14 
Summary of Logistic Regression Analysis for significant Decision Variables Predicting 
Depressed and Healthy Individuals  
 
 
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 95% C.I. for 
EXP(B) 
       
Lower Upper 
Punishment -.062 .020 9.647 1 .002* .940 .904 .977 
MinimumAccept .312 .137 5.172 1 .023* 1.366 1.044 1.787 
WinningProbability .023 .010 5.625 1 .018* 1.023 1.004 1.043 
Constant .074 1.058 .005 1 .944 1.077 
  Note. * = p < .05 
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Table 15  
Summary of Logistic Regression Analysis for Self Report Predicting Depression and 
Healthy Controls  
 
 
B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp (B) 
BS Total -.18 .14 1.78 .18 .83 
BNS Total -.17 .22 .63 .43 .84 
CNS Total .07 .15 .18 .67 1.07 
CS Total  -.02 .11 .03 .86 .98 
BAS: Drive .04 .16 .06 .80 1.04 
BAS: Fun Seeking -.03 .28 .01 .92 .97 
BAS:Reward 
Responsiveness 
-.12 .24 .24 .62 .88 
BIS -.25 .15 2.84 .09^ .77 
Snaith-Hamilton .13 .07 2.94 .08^ 1.13 
Self-Esteem .42 .24 3.02 .08^ 1.52 
Constant -6.27 7.93 .63 .43 .002 
Note.  ^ < .09  
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Table 16 
Summary of Logistic Regression Analysis for Trending Self-Report Variables Predicting 
Depression and Healthy Controls  
 
 
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp (B) 95% C.I.for EXP(B) 
       
Lower Upper 
BIS -.32 .12 6.78 1 .009* .72 .57 .923 
Snaith Hamilton .20 .06 12.58 1 .000* 1.22 1.09 1.36 
Self-Esteem .56 .19 8.79 1 .003* 1.76 1.21 2.55 
Constant 17.57 5.78 9.22 1 .002 .000 
  Note. * = p < .01 
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Table 17 
Demographic Characteristics  
 
    
 
Depressed 
 
Control  
 
Significance 
 
N % N % p value 
Gender 
    
0.3 
Male  27 57.8 33 51.6 
 Female  37 42.2 31 48.4 
 Ethnicity 
  
 
 
0.76 
African American 34 53.1 33 51.6 
 Caucasian 24 37.5 23 35.9 
 Asian 4 6.2 7 10.9 
 Other 2 3.1 1 1.6 
 Education 
    
0.31 
No High School Diploma 4 6.3 1 1.6 
 High School Diploma/Technical 
Training 
26 41.3 23 35.9 
 Associates Degree 10 15.9 12 18.8 
 Bachelor's Degree 12 19 16 25 
 Master's Degree 11 17.5 9 14.1 
 Doctoral Degree 0 0 3 4.7 
 On Medication 
    
<.001** 
Yes 29 45.3 0 0 
 No 33 51.6 63 98.4 
 Not Reported  1 1.6 1 1.6 
 In Therapy 
    
<.001** 
Yes 33 51.6 2 2.31 
 No 29 45.3 61 95.3 
 Not Reported  1 1.6 1 1.6 
 
      
 
M SD M SD p value 
Age 40.45 13.48 38.53 11.73 0.4 
WASI  101.32 14.63 103.7 14.1 0.35 
BDI 30.03 10.46 2.9 4.32 <.001 
Note. ** = p < .001 
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Table 18 
Model free vs. model based RL 
 
 
Model Free Model Based 
 
BIC  BIC 
Rewards 
  Combined 12941.91 12933.34 
Controls 6225.36  6111.45 
MDD 6708.57  6764.83 
Punishment  
  Combined  13307.75 13212.10 13212.10 
Controls 6343.44  6197.60 
MDD 6924.08  6935.08 
Note. The bold values indicate the best fit statistics 
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Table 19 
Comparison of model fit based on parameters in the RL model 
 
  Model Free Model Based 
  BIC BIC 
Reward Learning      
No difference between MDD and Controls 12941.91 12933.34 
Different Stimulus Learning Rates 12910.06 12872.44 
Different Action Learning Rates 12951.01 12942.66 
Different Persistence 12948.90 12933.91 
Different Bias 12951.22 12942.64 
Punishment Learning      
No difference between MDD and Controls 13307.75 13212.10 
Different Stimulus Learning Rates 13261.16 13150.41 
Different Action Learning Rates 13308.60 13215.37 
Different Persistence 13309.25 13205.42 
Different Bias 13315.63 13219.08 
Note. The bold values indicate the best fit statistics 
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FIGURES 
 
  
 
Figure 1. Flow chart illustrating identification of included studies for IGT between group meta-
analysis.  
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Figure 2. Flow chart illustrating identification of included studies for mean IGT performance 
meta-analysis.  
 
  
 
110 
 
 
Figure 3. Effect Size Meta-analysis Funnel Plot. 
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Figure 4. Raw Score Meta-analysis Funnel Plot. 
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Figure 5. Poor performance on IGT as a function of clinical group, Non Personality Disorders < 
Personality Disorders < Frontal Lobe Lesions. 
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Figure 6. Scree plot for decision task factor analysis indicating a four-factor structure. 
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Figure 7. Scree plot for self-report factor analysis indicating a two-factor structure. 
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Figure 8. Sequence of events in A. Reward Learning Task and B. Punishment Learning Task. 
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Figure 9. A. Average proportion of rich choices for the depressed and control group in the 
punishment and reward learning tasks. * denotes p =  <.05. B. Average proportion of choosing 
fractal 1 across 90 trials for the depressed and control group in reward learning task. C. Same data 
as B for the punishment learning task. The shaded areas indicate trials between which depressed 
group performed significantly worse than control group.  
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Figure 10. A. Proportion of win-stay, lose-shift, win-stay same side, win-stay different side, lose-
shift same side and lose-shift different side choices in punishment learning task, * p < .05. B. 
Proportion of win-stay, lose-shift, win-stay same side, win-stay different side, lose-shift same side 
and lose-shift different side choices in reward learning task, * p < .05.  
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Figure 11. A. Choice behavior as a linear function of reward feedback 10 trials back. B. Choice 
behavior as a linear function of no punishment feedback 10 trials back. 
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